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Patents Absent Adversaries
Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec †
INTRODUCTION
The United States relies on an adversarial system of
dispute settlement. And yet, in a tribunal of steadily growing
importance for intellectual property disputes—the International
Trade Commission (ITC)—certain cases proceed without the
benefit of participation from adverse parties. The ITC’s
determinations are not limited to the defaulting parties but rather
are applied widely through the in rem relief of general exclusion
orders (GEOs) enforced at the U.S. border to keep infringing goods
out of the country. A separate form of adversarial exclusion follows
infringement determinations made by U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (Customs) and appeals therefrom. This article identifies
the phenomenon of adjudicating patents absent adversaries and
argues that it is both inefficient and ineffective to construe patent
claims without the guiding context of a controversy. Absent
adversaries, the public interests that are served by robust
adversarial participation in patent disputes go unrepresented.
The adversarial system relies on the parties to a dispute—
the adversaries—to gather and present evidence and to develop
and put forward arguments in support of their preferred
outcomes.1 In contrast, the inquisitorial model of dispute
resolution, common in continental Europe, features a judge with
† Assistant Professor of Law, William & Mary Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
I would like to thank Nancy Combs, Neal Devins, Laura Heymann, Timothy Holbrook,
Sapna Kumar, Mark A. Lemley, Craig Nard, Nate Oman, Christopher Seaman, and
participants in the 2014 Works in Progress in IP Conference, Santa Clara Law School,
the 2014 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, Berkeley School of Law, the 2015
Works in Progress in IP Conference, cohosted by George Washington University Law
School and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the faculty workshop at Washington &
Lee University School of Law, and the Vanderbilt IP Scholars Roundtable for their
helpful comments. Max Wallot and Derek van den Abeelen provided excellent research
assistance for this project.
1 FRANKLIN D. STRIER & EDITH GREENE, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: AN
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 2-3 (1990) (listing four distinguishing characteristics of the
adversary system as (1) a “[p]resumption of conflict,” (2) “[p]arty control,” (3) the “lay
jury,” and (4) “[z]ero-sum remedies”).

1073

1074

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:3

greater power over the scope and direction of evidence gathering
and fewer procedural safeguards.2 The adversarial system is
lauded for determining the truth of claims, safeguarding
procedural rights, and supporting the efficient direction of
resources toward the most relevant and contested issues in a
dispute.3 All of these supposed benefits of the adversarial system
have been challenged.4 Nonetheless, the dominance of the
adversarial model is so great in the United States that even the
decisions of administrative agencies, staffed by experts and with
defined missions, are afforded more deference when the
proceedings are adversarial as opposed to inquisitorial.5
The participation of the adversary is of particular
importance in patent law because the outcome of patent litigation
affects not only the parties to the suit, but also the interests of
other potential innovators and the public. Patent litigation
requires a determination of the validity and scope of asserted
patent claims in order to resolve infringement claims.6 Together
with potential infringers, the public has a direct interest in the
accuracy of these determinations. Patent litigation can clarify the
scope of a patent so that competitors are confident in their
investments and able to compete with the patent holder by
designing around the patent. Patent litigation may also result in
invalidation of patents. Overbroad patents and patents that
remain in force but ought to be invalidated may chill innovation
and market competition, both of which benefit consumers through

2 This relatively “nonadversarial process” has been described as “an inquest
by the state.” Id. at 3.
3 See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
5 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001) (“We have
recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express
congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that
produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.” Additionally, “[i]t is fair
to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of
law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster
the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”);
Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The
Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 470 (2002) (citing Mead, 533 U.S. 218)
(explaining that legislative rulemaking and formal adjudication both “unquestionably
have the force of law” and should thus be afforded deference under Chevron).
6 Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS
L.J. 61, 68-69 (2006); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit
Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1105, 1113, 1119 (2004) (asserting that claim construction plays “the major[ ] role in
patent litigation” before assessing whether the Federal Circuit is providing certainty in
its rulings and finding that while not an “unqualified success,” there are indications
that it is moving in the right direction).
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lower prices and greater access to goods.7 As a result, the public
benefits when weak patents are challenged by competitors8 and
from increased certainty about the scope of valid patents.9
Any civil case that proceeded to judgment with
participation from only one party would raise concerns about
justice, efficiency, accuracy, and the public interest. The
important role of adversaries as stand-ins for other important
interests in patent litigation makes it particularly worrisome
when a patent case proceeds without participation from one side
of the dispute. As a practical matter, the presence of a potential
infringer—and concrete goods accused of infringing—helps to
focus the dispute on specific terms in the patent claims. It is
difficult to identify potential claim interpretation disputes absent
alleged infringing goods against which they are to be compared.
Yet in the ITC—a tribunal of ever-increasing importance
in patent law—the scope and meaning of patent claims may be
determined without the participation of an adversary and
enforced against nonparties.10 The importation of goods that
infringe U.S. intellectual property rights is one type of unfair
trade that may form the basis for filing a complaint with the
ITC.11 Upon a finding of infringement, the ITC may issue a
limited exclusion order (LEO), which is “limited to persons
determined by the ITC to be violating [the statute]” and identifies
specific, infringing goods to be excluded. The ITC may also issue a
general exclusion order, which prevents any party from importing
goods that infringe the patent as construed by the ITC.12
A GEO may be issued upon a showing that it is “necessary
to prevent circumvention of an exclusion order limited to products
of named persons” or if “there is a pattern of violation of this
7 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 656, 670 (1969); see also Sarah R.
Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 733, 740
(2012) (characterizing the patent as “a balance of access interests”).
8 Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 37, 64 (2009) (asserting that “[p]atent
litigation plays an important role in testing weak patents and ensuring that the public does
not suffer the adverse effects of invalid ones” in arguing the potential ill effects of allowing
patent litigation settlements between patent holder brand name drug manufacturers and
generic drug manufacturers because such agreements preclude validity challenges and
result in extended market exclusivity for the brand name drug manufacturers; these
“reverse-settlement” situations occur because of the framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act,
which was intended to encourage challenges to brand name drugs).
9 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978-79 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (stating that “it is only fair (and statutorily required) that competitors be able to
ascertain to a reasonable degree the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude”).
10 See infra Part II.
11 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
12 See infra note 165 and accompanying text for an example of language
typical of a GEO.
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section and it is difficult to identify the source of infringing
products.”13 While LEOs may be useful tools for a patent holder
who can identify specific, infringing products imported by specific,
named parties, the broader relief of a GEO is particularly
desirable to patent holders to protect against imports that are
difficult to detect and that are sold in markets with relatively
easy entry. Recent examples include a series of GEOs for ink and
toner cartridges,14 and sildenafil—sold by Pfizer under the name
Viagra.15 Infringing versions of these products are often
indistinguishable from licensed products, and because goods are
directly marketed to consumers—often through email and by
small and unknown sales outlets—infringing sales are
particularly difficult to detect.16 All exclusion orders are enforced
by Customs. For GEOs, the process involves analysis of imported
goods to determine if they infringe patents named in exclusion
orders.17 This is no small task: in 2013, Customs seized $1.7
billion worth of goods for intellectual property rights violations.18
There are two ways that patent claims may be
adjudicated, essentially ex parte, in the context of an ITC
investigation. First, the meaning and scope of a U.S. patent
holder’s asserted patent claims may be decided by an
13 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2); see also T. CY WALKER & AIMEE N. SOUCIE, UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND THE ITC: A TREATISE ON SECTION 337 ACTIONS § 1.8 (Patrick Colsher
ed., 2015). The grant of GEOs is governed by section 337(d)(2), which was amended in
1994 following a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) panel report that
limited GEOs to particular circumstances. 19 C.F.R. § 210.50(c) (2015). The 1947 GATT
was incorporated and significantly expanded by the 1994 agreement establishing the
World Trade Organization. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
14 Certain Toner Cartridges and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-740,
USITC Pub. 4376 (Sept. 27, 2013) (Issuance of General Exclusion Order and Cease and
Desist Orders) (granting GEO).
15 Certain Sildenafil or any Pharmaceutically Acceptable Salt Thereof, Inv.
No. 337-TA-489 (Oct. 27, 2003) (Initial Determination) (granting GEO).
16 Certain Toner Cartridges and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-740,
USITC Pub. 4376 (Oct. 5, 2011) (Commission Opinion) (noting that Internet sales allow
for obfuscation of seller identity, barriers to entry are low, and there are many sources
for infringing products, with 5,000 remanufacturers worldwide and 1,283
manufacturers in China alone).
17 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2). The ITC’s jurisdiction is in rem and is derived from
its subject matter jurisdiction over “the importation of articles . . . into the United
States.” Id. § 1337(a) (2004); see Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645 F.2d
976, 995-96 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
18 This number represents the manufacturer’s suggested retail price of goods
seized at the border for intellectual property rights violations, had the goods been
genuine. This number includes counterfeits and copyright violations in addition to
patent infringements. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., OFFICE OF INT’L TRADE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: FISCAL YEAR 2013 SEIZURE STATISTICS 2 (2013),
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ipr_annual_report_2013_072414%20Fi
nal.pdf [http://perma.cc/VEC7-BDU9].
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administrative law judge (ALJ), and broad relief may be granted
to the patent holder even though her position is unchallenged by
any adverse party in an ITC investigation.19 Second, without the
participation of the U.S. patent holder, affected importers may
challenge in federal court Customs’s broad enforcement of
exclusion orders, even though the proceedings may require
revisiting the scope and meaning of patent claims.20
These situations are unique to the ITC because the
remedy of a GEO is exclusive to the ITC. In federal district
court, the effects of a default judgment against an accused
infringer are constrained to that infringer.21 To the extent the
accused infringer is a stand-in for other innovators and the
public, it may be preferable for parties not to default, but there
is no great detriment when they do, as any future claims of
patent infringement against other defendants will allow an
opportunity to construe the scope of the patent. But when a
named party to an ITC investigation defaults, the effect is
much greater, since the result may be a GEO that prevents any
party from importing the infringing good.
The solution that is most consonant with our adversarial
system and the most practical to implement would delay timeintensive adjudication until interested adversaries are present.
Under this proposal, protests of exclusions under GEOs that
require complex claim construction and infringement
determinations may be referred back to the ITC for inter partes
proceedings. This change would allow importers affected by GEOs
to protest them before ALJs who are familiar with the case and
technology and would also allow patent holders to participate in
proceedings in which they have a direct interest.
A second possible solution would require amending the
law and ITC regulations to allow for more inquisitorial-type
proceedings when adversaries are not present to participate.
Under such a rule, once it is clear that there are no interested
adversaries to an investigation, the ALJ would be able to raise
issues of validity sua sponte and raise and request briefing on any
WALKER & SOUCIE, supra note 13, § 10:3.
Id.
21 See, e.g., BIC Corp. v. First Prominence Co., No. 00CIV.7155(SHS)(RLE),
2001 WL 1597983, at *1, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2001) (awarding $26 million in damages
for patent infringement against three defaulting defendants); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
55(a) (“When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has
failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise,
the clerk must enter the party’s default.”). Thus, default judgments are limited to “a
party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought” and who “failed to
plead or otherwise defend.” FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a).
19
20
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other relevant issues. The ITC is well situated to shift to an
inquisitorial model because it already includes participation by
independent investigative attorneys meant to represent the public
interest.22 As a result, it would be relatively simple to expand the
roles of ALJs and investigative attorneys and the scope of the
disputes that ALJs may consider. Nevertheless, this option would
be more difficult to implement, both politically and practically, as
the timing of default decisions, settlements, and consent orders
might require an ALJ to switch roles in the midst of an
investigation. In addition, it would not address the difficulty of
identifying relevant issues absent a controversy.
Part I of this article describes the purposes of the
adversarial system and how they translate to intellectual
property law. Part II explains the asymmetric system of patent
scope and infringement determinations made by the ITC and
Customs. Part III suggests and weighs possible solutions and
argues that of these options, delaying adjudication until interested
parties come forward to participate is the soundest solution that is
most consonant with the values of the adversarial system.
I.

ADVERSARIES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

A.

The Role and Function of Adversaries in Courts and
Administrative Agencies

Dispute resolution is often classified as either adversarial
or inquisitorial. Adversarial systems rely on the parties to a
dispute to gather and present evidence and legal arguments,
whereas inquisitorial systems grant the judge wide latitude in
defining the scope of a dispute and the evidence relevant to
resolving it. What follows is a description of the purported
benefits of the adversarial system and its most common critiques.
Rather than taking a position on the comparative benefits of each
system, however, this article focuses on the effects of relying on
the adversarial system when one of the adversaries is absent,
particularly in cases where the results of a dispute have a
widespread impact.
The
adversarial
system
is
“[a]
procedural
system . . . involving active and unhindered parties contesting
with each other [in order] to put forth a case before an

22 See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text discussing the Office of
Unfair Import Investigation.
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independent decision-maker.”23 Adversarial trials rely on lawyers
to “gather[], select[], present[], and prob[e] the evidence.”24 This
system follows a philosophy of keeping separate the functions of
the advocate and the judge and is often contrasted with the
inquisitorial system, in which the judge plays a more active role
in initiating and determining the scope of the case and exercising
control over the investigation and trial.25 The quality of the
system depends in large part on the quality—both absolute and
relative—of the parties’ advocacy.
The American adversarial system has its roots in the
English legal system.26 An emphasis on procedural rules, coupled
with a hands-off approach by judges, developed during the mideighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries.27 The adversary system
adhered to by modern American courts exhibits these same
characteristics. Private parties initiate disputes, limited by
constitutional standing requirements that require a controversy
to exist in order for a court to rule on the substance of a claim,
thus requiring at least two parties with adverse interests.28
Interested parties also shape the collection and use of evidence,
with stringent procedural rules governing the discovery process.
And subject to further procedural rules, parties are primarily
responsible for deciding which legal and factual arguments to
bring.29 Judges manage litigation, but their role has been

23 Adversary System, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This is in
contrast to the inquisitorial system that much of the world uses, defined as “[a] system
of proof-taking used in civil law, whereby the judge conducts the trial, determines what
questions to ask, and defines the scope and the extent of the inquiry.” Inquisitorial
System, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
24 JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 1 (2005).
25 Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30-35
(Harold J. Berman ed., 1961); Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity
Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1187 (2005).
26 See John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A
View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1196-97 (1996).
27 Early (sixteenth century) English civil litigation was conducted through an
adversarial process—a process that John Langbein described as “trial-avoiding” for its
focus on pleading practice that allowed judges to determine which cases could be resolved
pretrial on issues of law and which required a trial for limited, factual questions.
LANGBEIN, supra note 24, at 6-7. For an argument that the American “legal system only
became fully ‘adversarial’ in the relatively recent past,” see Kessler, supra note 25, at
1184 (tying the adoption of a full, adversarial process to the nineteenth-century move
towards more oral advocacy and the procedures that accompanied it).
28 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . [and]
Controversies . . . .”); see also, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4, 19, 20 (on proper service of process and
required and permissive joinder of parties, respectively). Although a requirement in the
adversarial system, inquisitorial systems may also resolve disputes between parties.
29 Certainly judges may raise legal issues sua sponte.
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described as that of “a neutral umpire, deciding the questions of
fact and law raised by the parties.”30
In many instances, the adversarial system relies on
private parties to stand in for other private—and public—
interests. Rulings in civil cases, such as decisions involving
property rights, often apply beyond the parties to a case.
Property-related rulings may settle disputes between two
parties, but they also routinely settle ownership and boundary
problems that apply more broadly. Indeed, it would be extremely
inefficient if, having established her ownership over a parcel of
land, a property holder had to relitigate that issue every time
someone trespassed on it.31 The contours and scope of property
rights often affect parties beyond those represented in any given
dispute, and accuracy and certainty are important to third
parties “both to avoid violating [rights] and to acquire them from
present holders.”32 For example, an in rem proceeding, which is
“taken directly against property, and [which] has for its object
the disposition of the property,”33 is binding “against the world,”
including those who have not been made party to a proceeding.34
In standard in rem proceedings, such as actions to quiet title to a
parcel of land, often there are “adverse claims of known persons”
at stake.35 As a result, in rem proceedings generally include
notice requirements that attempt to draw advocates for
competing legal positions. These requirements may require
public posting of pending disputes in order to bring interested
parties to the table and alert the court to competing arguments
about the status of the property.36 A system that relies on parties
to develop relevant arguments requires the parties’ actual
presence. In this sense, notice requirements are imbued with the
secondary purpose of drawing proponents for adverse positions.

Kessler, supra note 25, at 1188.
This surely underlies the property registration systems that create a
presumption of ownership and provide property owners and those who contract with
them some degree of certainty in their dealings.
32 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000) (suggesting
that standardization of forms of property would reduce these externalities).
33 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877).
34 WILLIAM MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW 98 (6th ed. 1905).
35 Enhancing the Marketability of Land: The Suit to Quiet Title, 68 YALE L.J.
1245, 1265 n.102 (1959). If this is the case, and the resulting ruling is only binding on
parties and those who were constructively served, the proceeding is only considered to be
quasi in rem. Id.
36 Requirements of Notice in In Rem Proceedings, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1257,
1264 (1957) (discussing notice requirements for in rem cases).
30

31
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In the United States, even nonstandard dispute resolution
procedures reflect a belief in the superiority of adversarial
proceedings. Administrative agencies, which engage in both
inquisitorial and adversarial proceedings, receive greater
deference from reviewing courts when their procedures bear the
hallmarks of adversarial proceedings.37 The ITC engages in
adversarial dispute resolution in its investigations of unfair
competition in importation, such as importation of goods that
infringe intellectual property rights.38 In these investigations,
known as “section 337 investigations,” the ITC frequently grants
in rem relief to parties who request an investigation into alleged
unfair practices in import trade.39 Its discovery process and triallike hearings result in deference to its decisions that would not be
granted to an agency determination lacking the hallmarks of an
adversarial hearing.40 The ITC publishes notices of investigations,
inviting interested parties to participate, as is customary in cases
where in rem relief is sought.
At the same time, the ITC contains some elements that
are more familiar in inquisitorial dispute resolution settings.
First, proceedings are styled as investigations by the agency,
rather than disputes between parties. In addition, the ITC has an
Office of Unfair Import Investigations (OUII), which is charged
with representing the public interest during some investigations,
thus embodying the truth-seeking and public interest–serving
roles generally filled by the judge in the inquisitorial system.41
The adversarial system has been lauded as superior to
the inquisitorial system for determining the truth behind

37 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001); Merrill & Watts,
supra note 5, at 470.
38 See infra Sections II.A-II.C. For a counterexample, social security disability
hearings, conducted before ALJs, are generally inquisitorial as opposed to adversarial.
Jeffrey S. Wolfe & Lisa B. Proszek, Interaction Dynamics in Federal Administrative Decision
Making: The Role of the Inquisitorial Judge and the Adversarial Lawyer, 33 TULSA L.J. 293,
297-98 (1997) (discussing the ALJ’s inquisitorial role of developing evidence).
39 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012); see infra Part II.
40 Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron
Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1969-70 (2013) (stating that the
“grant of formal adjudicatory or rule-making power is generally sufficient to satisfy the
force-of-law requirement” for agencies to receive deference).
41 See infra Section II.C; see also Adjudication and Enforcement, FED. REG.,
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2011/05/02/2011-10552/adjudication-and-enforcement
[http://perma.cc/396Y-K7Q3] (last visited May 17, 2016) (“The Supplement to the
Strategic Human Capital Plan 2009-2013 issued by the Commission on January 18,
2011, provides that the Office of Unfair Import Investigations (‘OUII’) will not
participate in a subset of Section 337 cases and will participate selectively in another
subset of cases. In order to better allocate its resources, OUII may have to assign
attorneys to investigations on an issue by issue basis.”).
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competing claims,42 limiting government intrusion on rights by
providing greater procedural fairness,43 and conserving judicial
resources.44 All of these benefits have been disputed by those
who argue that the inquisitorial system yields better results in
terms of truth determination and resource conservation and
who suggest that complex procedural rules primarily serve to
shield wealthy litigants and disadvantage indigent litigants.45
One argument in favor of adversarial proceedings for
determining truth derives from skepticism towards judges. This
view suggests that soliciting different accounts of the evidence
from opposing parties, each with the incentive to cast the
evidence in the most favorable light for her “side,” is most likely to
allow an impartial arbiter to arrive at the truth.46 In contrast, a
42 Irving R. Kaufman, Does the Judge Have a Right to Qualified Counsel?, 61
A.B.A. J. 569, 569 (1975) (quoting Lord Eldon as stating that “truth is best discovered by
powerful statements on both sides of the question”); see also United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648, 656 (1984) (explaining that, in the criminal context, “[t]he right to the effective
assistance of counsel is . . . the right of the accused to require the prosecution’s case to
survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing”); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853,
862 (1975) (also a criminal case, stating that “[t]he very premise of our adversary system of
criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the
ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free”).
43 Professor Jolowicz explained that the adversarial process “ensures the
automatic observance of the basics of procedural justice” where “what really matters is
that [ ] at the end of the day, the parties—and especially the losing party—shall feel
that they have had a fair hearing.” JA Jolowicz, Adversarial and Inquisitorial Models
of Civil Procedure, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 281, 282-83 (2003) (giving as a further
example of procedural fairness the French principle, principe de la contradiction,
whereby a judge “takes nothing into account for the purposes of his decision that has
not been open to contradictory debate by the parties”).
44 As Francesco Parisi explains,

Most notably, in a well-known debate, Posner (1988) and Tullock (1988) have
taken opposite sides on this issue, defending respectively the adversarial and
the inquisitorial systems, on a variety of grounds. Posner argues that the
adversarial system is preferable because it allows the parties who bear the
costs and benefits of the litigation to shape the litigation. Alternatively, the
inquisitorial method shifts power to judges, and thus promotes an expansion
of the public sector as well. Posner contends that it is doubtful whether such
a shift would improve the performance of our judicial system.
Francesco Parisi, Rent-Seeking Through Litigation: Adversarial and Inquisitorial
Systems Compared, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 193, 194 (2002).
45 Kessler, supra note 25, at 1189 (2005) (“[C]omplex litigation has multiplied
the opportunities and incentives for parties to manipulate costly procedural devices to
overwhelm the adversary in a financial war of attrition. Devices such as discovery and
expert testimony often bear little relationship to their supposed purpose of truthseeking. Instead, they serve as weapons for wearing down the other side, thereby
ensuring the victory of litigants who are wealthy enough to make repeated motions for
production and to find experts willing to testify to any claim.”).
46 H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A
Reaction to Judge Frankel’s Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (1975) (“[T]he
juxtaposition of two contrary perspectives, the impact of challenge and counter-proof,
often discloses to a neutral intelligence the most likely structure of Truth. Thus, . . . I
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judge in an inquisitorial system might become wedded to a
particular perspective and fail to fully explore and develop
conflicting viewpoints.47 This argument applies to determinations
of both fact and law, because each side has incentives to seek out
evidence to support its claims and present the most compelling
arguments for different interpretations of the law.
Once the parties to a dispute are cast as adversaries,
the procedural rules that govern the dispute set out extrinsic
measurements of fairness that govern how parties amass
evidence and incorporate it into their arguments. In addition to
the rules governing the gathering and admissibility of
evidence, procedural safeguards include notice requirements,
and standing requirements limit which cases may be brought
to ensure that the court does not opine on matters that are not
in dispute between the parties.
In the criminal context, Professor Barbara Babcock has
suggested that casting accused criminals as adversaries of the
state that prosecutes them reflects more than a set of procedural
rules that ensure fair play among opponents.48 It also
demonstrates the “peculiar Anglo-American mindset”49 that
places an accused criminal at odds with a state that wants to take
something—freedom—from him and questions the ill effects of
casting the state as a competitor that might pursue victory over
justice.50 The contours of this discussion in the criminal context
transfer to the civil context, with some clear caveats.51 While civil
conclude that the adversarial encounter, for all its hazards, serves as one of the better
methods of reconstruction [of the actual contours of a past occurrence].”).
47 While the potential for “myopic” judges might exist in either system, the
adversarial system requires the judge to confront alternate theories that counsel have
taken the time to develop and support.
48 Barbara A. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1137 (1982) (citing J. BENTHAM, Impropriety of
the Exclusion Put Upon Self-Disserving Evidence by English Law, in 7 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 445 (Bowring ed. 1843)) (discussing Jeremy Bentham’s criticism that the
right against self-incrimination that forms a substantial basis of the adversarial system
turns justice into a sort of “fox hunt,” and is a rule that therefore does not aid in discovering
the truth, but instead turns the system into amusement).
49 Id. at 1138.
50 Id. Others have questioned the value of the adversarial system. See, e.g.,
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 14 (1996) (“Despite the longevity and
robustness of adversarialism as a mode of human discourse, even some philosophers
and epistemologists have questioned its value as the best way to understand the
world.” (footnote omitted)).
51 Although an adversarial criminal system may have been a transplant from
civil litigation. See LANGBEIN, supra note 24, at 7. The truth-determining ability of the
adversarial system has been explored most deeply in the criminal context. See, e.g.,
Babcock, supra note 48, at 1134 (“The usual justification for the adversary system is that
truth will emerge from a rule-bound contest between two opponents presided over by a
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suits are between private parties, thus appearing to obviate the
question of the relationship between an individual and the state,
the adversarial process still provides a set of rules and procedures
for the contest between interested parties. And while those
parties are perhaps more openly set on victory, justice is assumed
to be the byproduct of the contest.
Economic considerations also suggest the benefits of an
adversarial system in the civil context. In addition to the idea that
having representatives for two sides to a dispute serves to clarify
the factual and legal disputes, parties to a controversy may be in
the best position to determine the appropriate cost of its
resolution. As Judge Posner argues, “[i]f the size of the stakes in a
case is at least a rough proxy for the social costs of an inaccurate
decision, there will be at least a rough alignment between the
amount of search that is actually conducted and the amount that
is socially optimal.”52 In addition to the benefits of investing
resources proportional to the size—and hopefully, importance—of
a dispute, placing these costs on the parties minimizes costs to the
judiciary. As a result, the costs of discovery (or investigation) are
neither fully determined nor borne by the state.53
The adversarial system also suffers from limitations. The
idealized version of the adversarial system breaks down under
the realities of unequal resources among parties and the potential
for strategic spending that reflects settlement interests rather
than absolute value of claims. Critics of the adversarial system
also suggest that it prioritizes procedure over substance, thus
conflating a fairly reached outcome with a correct outcome.54 As a
result, the adversarial system is criticized for not seeking—nor
ultimately finding—the truth. Advocates use the procedural rules
strategically to obtain the best result for their clients, rather than

passive umpireal judge.”). In the criminal context, the adversarial system is contrasted
with the inquisitorial system employed in many European countries in which a judge
directs the legal and factual inquiries in a case. Id. at 1136 (describing the inquisitorial
system as “a scientific investigation” in which “few rules and technical impediments
constrain [the judge’s] search for truth”). The account proves useful for understanding the
role of adversaries in civil disputes, although the purposes and procedures of criminal law
often diverge from those in civil cases. Id. at 1134.
52 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1488 (1999).
53 Id. But see John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 823, 823-24 (1985) (decrying the adversarial excesses of the American legal
system compared to the German inquisitorial system).
54 THEODORE L. KUBICEK, ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: AMERICA’S COURT SYSTEM
ON TRIAL 12 (2006) (“The courtroom is an arena for a contest, even a war, between the
opposing parties, not a forum for determining the truth.”).
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seeking a just result.55 From this view, too, the costs of discovery
and the damage that can be inflicted through that process form
part of the strategy for achieving a desirable outcome. Instead of
acting as an internal constraint on each party to focus on the most
important aspects of a dispute, the economic cudgel of litigation
costs can be wielded to expand the scope of the dispute.
These critiques have the most weight when there is
unequal representation of parties and the greatest impact when
the private parties are standing in for the greater interests of the
public.56 Some parties are unable to afford representation or lack
resources to fully litigate all issues. This may result in unequal
representation of the parties to a dispute. This economic imbalance
impacts the truth-determining quality of the adversarial process. If
one side is not fully argued, then a judge who is reliant on
adversarial arguments will have difficulty discerning the truth. In
other words, if it is the careful selection of evidence and the choice
and development of legal arguments by the parties that allow the
judiciary to discern the truth in factual matters and the correct
interpretation and application of the law in legal matters, then
the economic inability of one side to properly play its role should
be of great concern. In particular, the most “important” areas of a
dispute will not be properly identified. Even if they are, without
fully developed arguments, a noninquisitorial judge may not
reach the correct outcome. The resulting injustice may be
relatively small when a limited number of parties are involved
and the allocation of the disputed asset is not of great societal
interest. But decisions that are factually or legally wrong and that
impact parties beyond those with an interest in the specific
dispute are of greater concern. It follows that it is even more
problematic when a party is wholly absent from a dispute that
has implications for those beyond the immediate litigation. Patent
law is one such area: decisions regarding the validity and scope of
a patent affect parties beyond those present to a dispute. Rules of
estoppel prevent the results from being applied without the
55 As a result, much of the literature on the adversarial system discusses the
potential conflict between lawyers acting as officers of the court and as advocates for their
clients. See, e.g., KUBICEK, supra note 54 (describing the conflict between lawyers’ goals of
winning and their duties to the courts); Fuller, supra note 25, at 30-37 (discussing the
tension between a system that allows a lawyer to defend a man he knows to be guilty and
the pursuit of truth); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy
Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 24 (2005) (looking to mid-nineteenth-century case law to
explain that properly understood, the tension in the adversary system is between a lawyer’s
duty to his client and a sense of professional—as compared with personal—morality).
56 I am referring here to interests beyond the universal public interest in
accurate and just resolution of private disputes. See supra Section I.A (discussing
public interest in accurate patent scope and validity determinations).
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opportunity for further argument in district court patent
litigation.57 Due to the nature of ITC proceedings and the in rem
remedies available to complainants, however, decisions from that
agency may have a direct, legal impact on those not present
during proceedings.
B.

Patent Law’s Particular Reliance on Adversaries

Patents are time-limited rights to exclude, granted by the
government, intended to encourage innovation and investment in
the development and distribution of new technologies.58 Patents
allow rights holders to exclude competition and therefore charge
higher prices for their goods. In exchange, the public benefits
when companies innovate in order to reap those higher prices.59
In addition to enjoying access to these protected works—albeit at
a premium price—during the term of protection, the public again
benefits when the intellectual property falls back into the public
domain. Commercial competitors of intellectual property rights
holders may also be restricted during the term of the patent, but
competitors benefit from disclosure of the works, licensing
opportunities, and their own abilities to obtain protection for
improvements and works that build on the protected rights. As a
result, diverse parties are affected by patent grants and are
harmed by the grant of overbroad or ultimately invalid patents.
At the same time, because the benefits of patent invalidation are

57 Even if a patent has been found valid in previous litigation, later litigants
not parties to the earlier lawsuit may challenge its validity and advance novel claimconstruction arguments. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.
313 (1971).
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”); see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1017 (1989) (explaining that the
right of exclusion is meant to provide an incentive for individuals to invest in research
and to disclose their new inventions to benefit the general public); David S. Olson,
Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting
Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 195-97 (2009) (analyzing how the
patent system offers a solution to the public goods problem by granting inventors the
exclusive right to control their invention for 20 years).
59 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1580 (2003) (discussing how the exclusive rights granted to inventors is a
limitation society is willing to accept in the name of greater innovation and social
utility of inventions). Other means of encouraging innovation and artistic expression
exist, of course, such as grants, prizes, and tax incentives. This summary of intellectual
property rights does not address the rich scholarship on whether and when such
mechanisms might be preferable substitutes for intellectual property law.
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diffuse, while the harms of litigation are concentrated, patent
challenges are a public good that may be underencouraged.60
The patent system was designed to rely on private parties
to challenge issued patents on “ideas which do not merit patent
protection.”61 Patents are granted by the government, following
application and examination by the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO). In determining whether to issue a patent, the
USPTO applies the statutory requirements that an invention be
novel, nonobvious, and useful, in an iterative process that may
result in the issuance of a patent with narrower claims than those
originally included in the patent application.62 The patent system
is more than a simple registry because the examination provides
substantive review, during which there is potential for an
application to be denied or a patent issued only after revision.
Nonetheless, the contours of patent rights are often determined in
postgrant litigation, either in federal district courts or through
administrative procedures that redetermine the scope and
validity of patents.63 As the Supreme Court has recognized, one
reason to encourage postgrant challenges to patents is that they
are generally issued without the benefits of adversarial
arguments.64 Professor Mark Lemley has argued that this state of
affairs, with a system more rigorous than a simple registry but
less than an exhaustive examination at the USPTO, is justified
given the very large number of patent applications filed, the high
marginal cost of more careful examination, and the low number of
patents that become valuable.65 In 2013, for example, 6,092 patent

60 See generally Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: LitigationStage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667 (2004) (discussing
why the diffuse benefits of patent invalidation may lead to underencouragement of
challenges to patents).
61 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 656, 669 (1969) (further noting that the
existence of an unchallenged patent “may deter others from attempting to compete
with the licensee”); Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1929 (2015)
(suggesting ways that validity ought to be challenged by competitors, such as through
declaratory judgments and administrative review).
62 The application may also be rejected or issued as filed.
63 Issued patents are presumed valid, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012); however,
uncertainty associated with the validity and scope of an issued patent may well persist
until that patent has been litigated. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic
Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 75-76 (2005) (1.5% of issued patents are litigated;
half of those are found invalid).
64 Lear, 395 U.S. at 669-70 (“[T]he Patent Office is often obliged to reach its
decision in an ex parte proceeding, without the aid of the arguments which could be
advanced by parties interested in proving patent invalidity.”).
65 Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U.
L. REV. 1495, 1495-97 (2001).
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suits were filed in district courts,66 41 new patent-related
investigations were undertaken in the ITC under section 337,67
and 298 postgrant reexamination requests were made to the
USPTO.68 These suits still involve a small number of patents
compared to the 290,083 patents issued in 2013.69
In a patent infringement suit in federal district court, the
court’s determination generally consists of two steps.70 First, in a
process called claim construction, the court determines the
meaning and scope of the patent claims. Second, the court looks
at the accused product or process and determines whether it
satisfies the claims of the patent. The court may also hear
counterclaims of patent invalidity, as well as various defenses to
infringement. Relief for infringement may include damages and
injunctive relief.71
Administrative agencies, such as the USPTO and the
ITC, have become increasingly involved in determining the
reach of patents. The role of the USPTO has always been
central—it does, after all, act as a gatekeeper by determining
whether to grant patents and register trademarks. Its role has
expanded, however, with the 2011 passage of the Leahy-Smith
66 OWEN BYRD & BRIAN HOWARD, LEX MACHINA: 2013 PATENT LITIGATION YEAR
REVIEW i (2013), http://pages.lexmachina.com/rs/lexmachina/images/LexMachina2013%20Patent%20Litigation%20Year%20in%20Review.pdf [http://perma.cc/K9XJ-67RP]
[hereinafter LEX MACHINA].
67 Id. at ii.
68 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT 154 (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2014PAR.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2F35-UVNZ] [hereinafter USPTO ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT]. This
number is lower than in previous years because of changes in postgrant review
procedures implemented pursuant to the America Invents Act. In 2012, for example,
there were a total of 1,387 postgrant review proceedings. Id.
69 For another measure, compare LEX MACHINA, supra note 66 (4,917 patents
were at issue in litigation in 2013), with USPTO ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 68, at
144, 146 (564,007 utility patent applications were filed and 265,979 were issued in 2013).
Different PTO sources have small discrepancies in these numbers, though either set
supports the notion that far more patents are filed and granted than are ever litigated. See
U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963–2014, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm [http://perma.cc/795H-AE7Y]
(last visited May 17, 2016) (571,612 utility patent applications filed and 277,835 granted in
2013). Of course, the litigated patents were likely not the same ones issued in 2013, but the
order of magnitude of patent grants has remained the same for the past 20 years, allowing
the general observation to stand. Id.
70 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996).
71 The availability of injunctive relief has somewhat decreased following the
Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange. See Ebay Inc., v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent
Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (finding
that for certain business models and technology areas, patent holders were far less likely to
obtain injunctive relief following eBay); Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to
Spur Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 733 (2012) (discussing denial of injunctive relief in cases
following eBay).
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America Invents Act (AIA), which encourages greater use of
postgrant review to narrow or invalidate issued patents.72
Similarly, filings at the ITC have increased as the forum has
become increasingly attractive to patent holders.
Although the ITC applies the same substantive patent law
as federal district courts, there are some key differences between
proceedings at the ITC and typical adversarial proceedings. One
is that staff attorneys in the OUII may participate in the
investigation in various ways, such as by helping parties file
complaints, advising the ITC on the institution of new
investigations, and—as a third party to the litigation—
representing the public interest.73 The ITC makes determinations
of both validity and infringement following proceedings before
ALJs. These proceedings are similar to those undertaken in
district court proceedings in terms of the applicable substantive
law.74 Validity and infringement determinations, however, are
made as a part of the ITC’s larger determination of whether there
has been a violation of applicable trade laws. If it finds there has
been a violation, the ITC may issue an exclusion order or grant
other relief. As damages are not available, the exclusion order is
the main form of relief litigants seek in the ITC.75 ITC
determinations of invalidity do not have preclusive effect in district
court proceedings.76 Nevertheless, exclusion orders may affect
nonparties to ITC proceedings and result in the exclusion of
products at the border, as discussed in Part II.77
Patent law is part of the general “legal tapestry”78 of
American jurisprudence, and as such, the same safeguards of the
adversarial process are present in jurisdictional, procedural, and
substantive patent laws.79 As in other civil disputes, adversaries
72 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 281
(2011). The AIA expanded the PTO’s ability to narrow or invalidate already granted
patents through postgrant review and inter partes review procedures. 35 U.S.C.
§§ 311-19, 321-29) (2012).
73 See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
74 See Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of
the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 551-58 (2009) (discussing the areas in which the Federal
Circuit has ruled that portions of the Patent Act apply in section 337 investigations,
and suggesting a blanket amendment to section 337 to clarify that the Patent Act
applies to determinations before the ITC).
75 See infra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
76 See Kumar, supra note 74, at 560.
77 See infra Section II.D.
78 Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent
Law, 3 IP THEORY 62, 71-72 (2013) (suggesting that part of the Supreme Court’s
interest in patent law reflects its rejection of patent exceptionalism, and describing
cases in which the Court analyzed patent issues through a lens of nonpatent doctrine).
79 Id.
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are charged with carrying out the truth-finding and efficiency
goals of the legal system. Thus, in patent law disputes, advocates
dispute the boundaries of government-granted rights to exclude
others from making, selling, or using (inter alia) a claimed
invention. Similar standing and procedural requirements apply in
patent law as in other civil litigation. And the role of adversaries
is particularly important because their arguments ensure a
robust public domain through the narrowing and invalidation of
patents (where appropriate).
These decisions reach beyond the parties to a dispute. A
patent holder whose patent is invalidated against one competitor
cannot later assert the patent against another.80 And if a patent is
found to be valid, other innovators will rely on the court’s decision
in evaluating whether their own products infringe, and if so,
whether to seek a license or redesign their products.81
While patent litigation plays an important role for
competitors, the public also has a strong interest in limiting
overbroad or invalid patents.82 Intellectual property law determines
the allocation of rights between the rights holder, other innovators
and commercial entities, and the public. Overbroad or invalid
patents hinder the ability of others to innovate. Even in a best-case
scenario where such patents are cheaply licensed, invalidated, or
narrowed in subsequent proceedings, they add transaction and
other costs for other innovators. These costs represent a transfer
of value away from future innovation to those whose activity does
not rise to the level considered worthy of a patent reward. At worst,
overbroad or invalid patents chill innovation by actors who are
unable or unwilling to pay the costs associated with investigating,
negotiating, or litigating the patents. As a result, the private
parties in intellectual property disputes who challenge patents
serve as stand-ins for all potential innovators. They also represent
80 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971)
(holding that a patent holder is estopped from asserting a patent that was previously
held invalid in federal court against a different defendant); Mendenhall v. BarberGreene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[O]nce the claims of a patent are held
invalid in a suit involving one alleged infringer, an unrelated party who is sued for
infringement of those claims may reap the benefit of the invalidity decision . . . .”).
81 The question of collateral estoppel in claim construction is analyzed “under
the law of the regional circuit.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v.
Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, the legal
effects of prior claim-construction decisions vary. However, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit explained that in claim construction, “the court is defining the federal
legal rights created by the patent document.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
82 See Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 498, 500 (2015) (arguing for increased standing for patent challenges and
describing “the injury that arises from even the mere existence of a patent”).
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the public’s interest in encouraging innovation. Their efforts lead
to the elimination of invalid patents and determinations of
appropriate borders between the rights of one inventor and those
of successor competitors.
The public also has a more direct interest in the narrowing
and elimination of overbroad and invalid patents. In addition to
benefitting from the potential for future innovation, the public
benefits from increased competition in the production of
unpatented goods. An overbroad or invalid patent allows the
patent holder to charge premium prices for goods that fall within
its scope.83 The narrowing or invalidation of a patent allows
competitors to make and sell goods in a competitive market.84
These innovation and competition interests form the basis of the
public interest in patent litigation.
To be sure, competitors rarely choose to defend patent
infringement suits out of a sense of civic duty alone. In claimconstruction hearings, patents are generally narrowed in the
context of accused infringers’ arguments that the patent does not
cover their accused products. But patent challenges cannot be
brought by just anyone. The U.S. Constitution provides that
federal courts may exercise jurisdiction only over “[c]ases” or
“[c]ontroversies.”85 This limitation is reflected in the requirement
that a litigant demonstrate her standing to bring suit.86 Despite
the general public interest in the scope and effectiveness of
intellectual property rights, constitutional standing requirements
limit the cases that can be brought to those between patent
owners and alleged infringers.87 In addition, because the benefits
83 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722,
730 (2002) (stating that a patent monopoly is a property right, and “like any property
right, its boundaries should be clear”).
84 United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)
(explaining, in the context of claim definiteness, that if a patent’s boundaries are unclear,
there will result “[a] zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter
only at the risk of infringement claims”).
85 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
86 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 490 (2009); Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (explaining the requirement that a plaintiff suffer an
injury in fact that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’
or ‘hypothetical,’” that there be “a causal connection between that injury and the conduct
complained of,” and that a favorable decision would likely redress the injury (quoting
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990))).
87 Thus, for example, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Myriad included an
analysis of the ACLU’s standing to bring suit challenging the validity of a patent on behalf
of patients who could not afford diagnostic tests from the only source that provided them.
The Court found that only a doctor who had previously used the test had standing to bring
the declaratory judgment claim against the patent holder. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 n.3 (2013) (citing Medimmune, Inc. v.
Genetech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)). The interest in bringing certainty to the scope and
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of narrowing or invalidating a patent may be dispersed among
numerous constituencies, whereas the costs of bringing such a
challenge will be concentrated, incentives to bring suit are low.88
While standing and jurisdictional requirements may
narrow the number of potential parties who can challenge
patents, the requirements also ensure that the parties who
appear in court have adverse interests and will rigorously develop
their arguments in ways that aid the court in arriving at truth for
all the reasons discussed above.89 Thus, together, standing
requirements and practical considerations mean that the parties
to a patent lawsuit play a crucial role in determining the contours
of patents—contours that impact the interests of nonparties.
II.

ASYMMETRIC REPRESENTATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION

A.

The ITC’s Emergence as a Forum for Patent Enforcement

The ITC conducts intellectual property–based import
investigations as part of its broader investigative responsibilities
for trade matters.90 The ITC is the modern incarnation of the Tariff
Commission, which was established by President Woodrow Wilson
in 1916 to study various aspects of U.S. tariff administration and
effects.91 Its powers were soon expanded to allow the Commission
to order exclusion of imports that “destroy or substantially injure
an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United
States” as a result of unfair trade practices.92 That provision was
validity of patents has led Michael Burstein to argue for the expansion of standing doctrine
to allow for a broader potential group of challengers. Burstein, supra note 82, at 500.
88 See Miller, supra note 60.
89 See supra Section I.A.
90 See, e.g., About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, http://www.usitc.gov/
press_room/about_usitc.htm [http://perma.cc/X7QX-7DCP] (last visited May 17, 2016).
91 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2231 (2012); see also William E. Perry,
Administration of Import Trade Laws by the United States International Trade Commission,
3 B.U. INT’L L.J. 345, 346 (1985) (detailing the origins of the ITC in the Tariff Commission,
“a bipartisan commission designed to investigate the administrative, fiscal, and economic
effects of the customs laws, as well as to study tariff relationships between the United
States and foreign countries”).
92 Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-318, § 316(a), 42 Stat. 858, 943-44 (1922).
At the same time, the ITC was given the power to impose penalty duties. S. Alex Lasher
further detailed how the Tariff Act of 1922 built on the momentum of the Revenue Act of
1916 and included section 316, the predecessor to section 337, “grant[ing] the President
discretionary authority to impose penalty duties or order the exclusion of imports which,
as a result of unfair trade practices, destroyed, injured or impaired the development of
industry in the United States,” so long as the industry was “efficiently and economically
operated.” S. Alex Lasher, The Evolution of the Domestic Industry Requirement in Section
337 Investigations Before the United States International Trade Commission, 18 U. BALT.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 157, 159 (2010) (footnote omitted) (quoting Tariff Act of 1922 § 316(a)).
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the precursor to section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which tasks
the Commission with investigations of unfair competition in
importation, including imports that infringe intellectual property
rights.93 The 1974 Tariff Act renamed the Tariff Commission and
bolstered the independence of the newly titled “International
Trade Commission” from the executive branch.94
The ITC has three objectives: (1) “administer[ing] U.S.
trade remedy laws within its mandate in a fair and objective
manner,”95 (2) providing independent analysis of “matters of
tariffs, international trade, and U.S. competitiveness” to the
executive and legislative branches,96 and (3) “maintain[ing] the
U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule.”97 The first part of the mission
statement encompasses section 337 investigations and the ITC’s
responsibilities relating to antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations,98 inter alia.99 Intellectual property enforcement at
That power was revoked, however, and the ITC is no longer statutorily permitted to
impose penalty duties when it finds unlawful importation. When the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act was passed in 1930, the President’s ability to levy penalty duties was
eliminated, based on a finding of the Tariff Commission that “[s]toppage of importation of
infringing articles through an order of exclusion from entry is the only effectual remedy.”
U.S. TARIFF COMM’N, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES TARIFF
COMMISSION 21 (1928). But see Colleen V. Chien, Protecting Domestic Industries at the
ITC, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 169 (2011); Colleen V. Chien & Mark
A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2012)
(arguing that the ITC should tailor its exclusion orders and use its bonding authority to
fashion remedies that better reflect remedies in standard patent infringement suits).
93 In particular, section 337 declares unlawful “[t]he importation into the
United States, the sale for importation, or the sale within the United States after
importation . . . of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent,”
in addition to other unfair methods of competition in importation that harm domestic
industry. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012); see JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 676 (3d ed. 1995).
94 Trade Act of 1974 § 2231(a); see also Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361,
§ 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703 (1930) (removing control of the Commission’s budget from the
Office of Management and Budget); Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1333(g) (2012)
(allowing the ITC to represent itself in court, in addition to representation from the
Department of Justice). These structural provisions ensuring independence from the
executive branch satisfy the constitutional delegation to Congress of the power “to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
95 About the USITC, supra note 90.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Countervailing duty investigations are governed by subtitle A of title VII of
the Tariff Act of 1930, as added to by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 19 U.S.C. § 1671
(2012). Antidumping duty investigations are governed by §§ 1671-1673. For an overview
of relevant statutory provisions, see U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SUMMARY OF STATUTORY
PROVISIONS RELATED TO IMPORT RELIEF (1998), http://usitc.gov/press_room/documents/
pub3125.pdf [http://perma.cc/2JT9-BK4J].
99 The ITC has authority to perform other investigations, which are less frequent,
such as investigations of injury to U.S. industries from increased imports, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2251-2254 (2012) (also known as the safeguards provision, sections 201-04 of the Trade
Act of 1974 allow investigations into whether sudden, increased imports of an article
represent a substantial cause of serious injury or threat of serious injury to a domestic
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the ITC is thus part of a larger statutory scheme aimed at
maintaining fair competition—the import-focused analog of
antitrust law.100
The enactment of section 337 was aimed at “protect[ing]
U.S. domestic industries from unfair competition in the
importation into the United States of goods made by foreign
companies.”101 The statute was amended in 1988 to explicitly
include infringement of intellectual property as a basis for unfair
import investigations and to eliminate the requirement of proving
injury to a domestic industry for such claims.102 Instead,
intellectual property rights holders are merely required to prove
that a domestic industry exists in section 337 cases that are based
on claims of intellectual property infringement. Although the
standard for obtaining an exclusion order is thereby lower in
intellectual property disputes than in other unfair trade disputes,
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has emphasized its
understanding that Congress sees the ITC as “fundamentally a
trade forum, not an intellectual property forum.”103 Nonetheless,
the ITC is currently most often used to seek exclusion orders
industry; if so, the ITC may recommend action to the President, including imposition of or
increase in an existing duty and quantitative restrictions), investigations of market
disruption by imports from communist countries, id. § 2436 (2012) (granting the ITC
authority to investigate and make determinations as to whether imports of an article
produced in a Communist country are causing market disruption for a domestically
produced article and the extent of the disruption, following which the President may
increase or impose a duty or quantitative restriction on importation or take other action to
alleviate the disruption), and investigations under the agricultural adjustment act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 624 (2012) (under which the Secretary of Agriculture may advise the President of imports
that render ineffective or materially interfere with a program undertaken by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, and following which the President may ask the ITC to
investigate the matter; the ITC may then make a recommendation to the President to
impose an import fee or a quantitative restriction on importation). The small number of
Communist countries and provisions limiting application of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act against WTO member-country imports have made the recent impact of these provisions
relatively small. Although the safeguard provisions of sections 201-04 are used more
frequently, there are diplomatic checks on their overuse.
100 See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 93, at 676. Jackson et al. compare the idea
of labeling certain trade practices “unfair” to the rationales underlying antitrust law’s
labeling of monopolization and price fixing as undesirable and deserving of regulation;
thus, the fairness label can be understood as the manifestation of “a desire to create a
level playing field where the producers of the world all have an equal chance to
compete.” JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 677 (4th ed. 2002).
101 Gary M. Hnath, General Exclusion Orders Under Section 337, 25 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 349, 350 (2005).
102 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
102 Stat. 1211, §§ 1341-1342 (1988).
103 John Mezzalingua Assocs., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 660 F.3d 1322,
1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Chien, supra note 92, at 176 (“While the ITC hears
many patent cases, its mandate is to promote fair trade and competition in products,
not to protect intellectual property rights outside of this context.”).
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covering goods that infringe U.S. intellectual property rights—
primarily patent rights, although claims based on trademark
infringement, copyright infringement, and trade secret theft are
sometimes brought as section 337 actions as well.104
The ITC has proved to be a desirable forum for patent
holders to enforce their rights.105 In particular, the ITC offers faster
resolutions and broader remedies, with some of the enforcement
costs resting on Customs.106 The broad remedy of the GEO allows a
patent holder to keep out infringing imports whatever their source,
obviating the need to request multiple investigations against only
nominally changed companies or goods.107 GEOs are particularly
valuable in industries with low barriers to entry and where it is
hard to detect the existence of infringing products. These
industries are vulnerable to unfair competition from infringing
imports because importers and manufacturers can form and
dissolve in ways that allow them to avoid the reach of typical
injunctive relief. The cost of detecting infringement and
identifying the source is often high for patent holders, making
GEOs enforced at the border by Customs particularly attractive.
One example is the toner cartridge industry. In an investigation
related to that technology, the ALJ found that there were 1,283
manufacturers in China alone, that it was hard to identify the
104 WALKER & SOUCIE, supra note 13, § 2:11; U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N,
STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2009-2014, at 13, http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/documents/
strategic_plan_2009-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/WS9H-YRB8]. The prevalence of patent
infringement cases brought under section 337 in comparison to other forms of intellectual
property cases is likely because copyright, trademark, and trade dress rights are
enforceable under other trade measures through the ITC or directly with Customs. But
see P. Andrew Riley & Jonathan R.K. Stroud, A Survey of Trade Secret Investigations at
the International Trade Commission: A Model for Future Litigants, 15 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 41, 45 (2013) (“Even parties well-versed in ITC patent practice can find it
valuable to include trade secret contentions in ITC complaints. Trade secret
investigations involve different legal issues of proof and a distinct domestic industry
requirement. Furthermore, the ITC allows for broader discovery, as it must fully address
each claim raised—making the addition of a trade secret claim essential to garnering a
complete picture of any suspected economic espionage.”). In 2013, the ITC instituted 42
new investigations; in 2011, the number of new section 337 investigations was at a record
high of 69. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, USITC SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS—FACTS AND
TRENDS REGARDING CASELOAD AND PARTIES (2014), http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/
documents/featured_news/337facts2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/V36F-EQ3D] [hereinafter
FACTS AND TRENDS].
105 See FACTS AND TRENDS, supra note 104 (showing increasing number of
section 337 investigations and explaining that “[m]ost section 337 investigations
involve allegations of infringement of patents or other intellectual property rights”).
106 Kumar, supra note 74, at 536-37; Chien & Lemley, supra note 92, at 2-3
(noting that following the Supreme Court’s 2006 eBay decision narrowing the
availability of injunctions, nonpracticing entities have increasingly turned to the ITC
because of its broad remedial powers).
107 Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps and Components, Inv. No. 337-TA-90,
USITC Pub. 1199 (Nov. 1981).
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source of any given toner cartridge (in part because of related
trademark problems), and that it was particularly difficult to
identify a source because toner cartridges were sold directly to
consumers over the Internet by companies that changed their
business names and otherwise obfuscated their identities.108
The ITC also offers procedural and remedial variations
from district court proceedings, variations that are attractive to
patent holders as alternatives for—but more often as complements
to—district court litigation.109 Section 337 investigations at the ITC
are adversarial in nature, although the ITC performs other tasks
that follow an investigative or inquisitorial model.110 While the
legal bases for a finding of patent infringement or validity are the
same at the ITC as they are in district courts, there are
significant differences between the two venues in terms of
procedures, the effects of a ruling, and remedies. Litigation can
proceed simultaneously in district court and at the ITC,
potentially yielding different results.111 In addition, ITC
determinations do not have preclusive effects on district court
litigation.112 In contrast, district court decisions do have preclusive
effect at the ITC.113 The ITC is limited to intellectual property
infringement disputes that relate to importation, thus covering
importation, sale for importation, or sale after importation,114
108 Certain Toner Cartridges and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-740,
USITC Pub. 4376 (June 1, 2011) (Order 26: Initial Determination Granting Complainant
Lexmark Int’l, Inc.’s Motion For Summary Determination On Violations of Section 337 By
Defaulting Respondents).
109 Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent
Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 70 (2008)
(finding that approximately two-thirds of section 337 cases initiated between January
1995 and June 2007 had an associated district court litigation).
110 As its name suggests, the protection of intellectual property rights is not
the only focus of the ITC, nor was it, historically, its primary focus.
111 See Kumar, supra note 74, at 538-40 (discussing the phenomenon).
112 The legislative history of the 1974 Trade Act explains that determinations
made under section 337 “should not have a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in
cases before [federal] courts.” S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 196 (1974). The Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed that Congress may insulate agency decisions from having preclusive
effect. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc. 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has also denied preclusive effect to ITC determinations of
validity or infringement. See, e.g., Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genetech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553,
1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90
F.3d 1558, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that “decisions of the ITC involving patent
issues have no preclusive effect in other forums,” but affirming the district court’s
discretion to “attribute whatever persuasive value to the prior ITC decision as it considers
justified”); LSI Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 604 F. App’x 924, 930 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(calling the rule against preclusion “well-settled”). But see Kumar, supra note 74, at 560
(arguing that because the ITC now hears so many patent disputes, their determinations
should be given preclusive effect).
113 In re Princo Corp., 478 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
114 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (2012).
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whereas district courts may additionally hear infringement suits
for the unauthorized making, using, offering to sell, or sale of a
patented invention in the United States.115
Although there are other differences between the ITC and
federal district courts, two situations unique to the ITC are most
at odds with the adversarial nature of rights determination.
These occur when the ITC engages in claim construction without
arguments from any alleged importers and when unnamed
importers challenge Customs’s infringement determinations
through that agency without the participation of the patent holder.
Both of these situations arise as a result of the ITC’s broad power
to grant relief that extends beyond the parties to an investigation.
The ITC asserts broad, in rem jurisdiction that extends
to future imports of goods.116 In a 1981 decision, the predecessor
court to the Federal Circuit explained that Congress exercised
its “plenary constitutional power to regulate foreign commerce,
a portion of which power Congress delegated to the ITC under
[section 337],” such that the ITC may “exclude products sold by
a domestic owner/importer/consignee, under its subject matter
jurisdiction, whether or not it named the foreign manufacturer
as a respondent or gave notice to that foreign manufacturer.”117
In such cases, then, the basis of jurisdiction is the imported
goods, rather than the nature or location of relevant parties.
This is problematic because the participation of adverse parties
and their development of arguments to limit the scope or
validity of patents are so important. Moreover, rulings on scope
and validity made without the benefit of adversarial argument
may be applied to nonparties, such that the burden is on those
parties to prove noninfringement based on the construction of a
patent that the nonparty had no opportunity to challenge. In
addition, ITC exclusion orders often include broad language
based on the patent claims, rather than descriptions of future
imports that may infringe those claims.118 The next section
115 Id. § 271(a). The infringement of patented processes likewise can be heard
in both district courts and the ITC, where the ITC’s jurisdiction is similarly restricted
to importation of goods manufactured through a patented process. Another difference
between the forums is that the statutory safe harbors in 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) are
available in district court litigation but not in section 337 investigations at the ITC.
Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
116 See Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645 F.2d 976 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
117 Id. at 985-86.
118 Daniel E. Valencia, Appeals from the International Trade Commission:
What Standing Requirement?, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1171, 1173 (2012) (“The ITC
has consistently issued exclusion orders with broad language to cover infringing future
products not yet developed at the time of the investigation.”).
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discusses section 337 investigations and their wide-ranging
impact in more detail.
B.

Section 337 Investigations

This section briefly explains the process for seeking relief
in the ITC from infringing imports, focusing in particular on
enforcement following the default of named respondents. It is
these situations in which claim construction may proceed without
adversaries and then result in broadly enforceable orders. If
named respondents engage in their adversarial roles, the ALJ
who hears arguments will have a full record on which to make
determinations about the validity and appropriate scope of a
patent.119 But if the named parties default and the patent holder
has requested a GEO, the ALJ must make claim-construction
determinations and evaluate the appropriateness of a GEO with
no participation from those having interests adverse to the patent
holder.120 Without parties representing adversarial positions, the
ALJ will hear only from the patent holders and the investigative
attorney assigned to the case,121 and the process of construing
patent claims is likely to be far less contested.122
A patent holder initiates the process by filing a complaint
with the ITC, typically naming a number of respondents, such as
foreign manufacturers and importers, alleged to have violated
section 337 through patent infringement.123 The complaint also
119 The caveat is that it is always possible that further claim construction will be
needed for different products accused of infringing a patent. The problem of conducting
claim construction “in an adversarial vacuum” is discussed in Section II.C. Even if solved in
situations of absent adversaries, it remains a potential issue any time a GEO is issued.
120 This situation may arise when all respondents default; the more frequent
scenario is that a number of respondents will settle or enter into consent agreements
with the complainant, following which the remainder of respondents are held in
default. See, e.g., Certain Toner Cartridges & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA829, USITC Pub. 4553 (Feb. 28, 2013) (Initial Determination) (granting GEO)
(detailing 16 respondents who had entered into consent agreements or settlements and
16 who had defaulted, leaving no respondents active in the investigation).
121 See infra Section II.C (discussing staff attorneys in the Office of Unfair
Import Investigations).
122 Certain Toner Cartridges & Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA829 (Feb. 28, 2013) (Order No. 25: Initial Determination Granting Complainants
Motion for Summary Determination of Violation by the Defaulting Respondents &
Recommended Determination on Remedy & Bonding) (“With the termination of the
Clover respondents and Clover-Customer respondents from the investigation . . . the
number of claim terms disputed by parties still active in the investigation was
significantly reduced.” (citation omitted)).
123 It is likely that complainants are motivated to name more respondents in
their complaints following a case decided in the Federal Circuit holding that limited
exclusion orders may only be applied against named respondents. Previously, in
contrast, limited exclusion orders could be targeted towards manufacturers and
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requests relief, such as an LEO that covers the infringing goods, a
GEO that applies to all imported, infringing goods, or a cease and
desist order.
The ITC has 30 days to decide whether to institute an
investigation.124 Upon commencing an investigation, the ITC
publishes a notice in the Federal Register.125 Interested parties
not initially named in the complaint may seek to intervene during
the course of the investigation.126 The investigation is assigned to
an ALJ, who presides over discovery, pretrial issues, and
hearings, in addition to making interim decisions and issuing a
final initial determination as to whether there was a violation of
section 337 and evaluating the appropriateness of the requested
relief.127 The ITC decides whether to review the ALJ’s interim
determinations throughout the investigation and then the final
initial determination, but unreviewed determinations are final.128
Often, parties will either default, enter into a settlement
agreement, or request a consent order soon after a complaint is
filed.129 In accordance with its name, a consent order is issued
with the consent of both parties and, upon the parties’ motion to
terminate an investigation, can be requested at any time during
the investigation. A consent order differs from a settlement in
that the ITC retains jurisdiction over parties’ compliance under
the former.130
importers of downstream products that incorporated infringing components made by
named respondents. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
124 This is a relatively mechanical decision that is based on whether the
complainant has alleged infringing importation and the existence or process of
establishment of a domestic industry. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2012); TOM M.
SCHAUMBERG, A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS BEFORE THE U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 38 (2d ed. 2012) (noting that in only two cases has
the Commission declined to initiate an investigation).
125 19 C.F.R. § 210.10(b) (2015).
126 Id. § 210.19.
127 SCHAUMBERG, supra note 124, at 38-39.
128 Id. at 39.
129 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c); 19 C.F.R. § 210.21(c). The two are similar, in that
they are based on agreements between the parties; however, the court retains
jurisdiction following a consent order to judge violations. A bit less than half of the
investigations initiated at the ITC are resolved through settlements or consent orders.
FACTS & TRENDS, supra note 104, at 4-5.
130 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c); 19 C.F.R. § 210.21. Parties may also agree to
termination on the basis of a settlement agreement, licensing agreement, or arbitration
agreement. However, in such cases, the Commission does not maintain its jurisdiction to
enforce the terms of the agreement. Merritt R. Blakeslee, Post-Litigation Enforcement of
Remedial Orders Issued by the U.S. International Trade Commission in Section 337
Investigations, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 248, 251 (2009). A consent order is
enforced by the Commission similarly to a cease and desist order. San Huan New Materials
High Tech, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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Many respondents do not enter an appearance at all or
appear only to state that they will default. The investigation
proceeds with hearings to determine that there is a domestic
industry, that there has been importation, and that the accused
imports infringe the patents in suit. When a party has
defaulted, an LEO may be entered against that respondent if,
assuming all the facts alleged in the complaint are true, a
violation has been shown.131
If the ITC determines there has been a violation of
section 337, it may issue either or both of a cease and desist
order and an exclusion order.132 The ITC may issue civil
penalties for the violation of these orders, but remedies for
section 337 investigations do not include monetary damages.133
Generally, the ITC issues an exclusion order following a finding
of violation unless the order would run counter to various
public interest factors.134 Exclusion orders are in rem relief;135
the ITC’s power to grant them is theoretically justified by its
jurisdiction over goods imported into the United States.136
Exclusion orders—which state that certain goods are excluded
from entering the United States—are enforced at the border by

19 U.S.C. § 1337(d).
Id. § 1337(f). A cease and desist order is a strong tool against the
distribution or further sale of goods that have already been imported. The Commission
may enter a cease and desist order against named respondents to an investigation who
have “a commercially significant” inventory of infringing goods in the United States to
prohibit the distribution and sale of those goods.
133 Id. § 1337(f)(2) (allowing for a maximum penalty of the greater of $100,000 per
day of violation or twice the domestic value of the imported goods); see also Ninestar Tech.
Co., Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 667 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming the imposition of
such penalties).
134 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (requiring consideration of “the public health and
welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or
directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers”);
SCHAUMBERG, supra note 124, at 181-82.
135 “[S]ection 337(a)(1)(B)(i) covers imported articles that directly or indirectly
infringe when it refers to ‘articles that—infringe’ . . . . Thus, infringement, direct or
indirect, must be based on the articles as imported to satisfy the requirements of
section 337.” Certain Electronic Devices with Image Processing Systems, Components
Thereof, and Associated Software, Inv. No. 337-TA-724, USITC Pub. 4374 (Dec. 21,
2011) (Commission Opinion); see also Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 742 F.3d
1350, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Sealed Air Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645 F.2d 976,
985 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“An exclusion order operates against goods, not parties.”).
136 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(B).
131

132
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Customs.137 Repeated violations may result in the seizure and
forfeiture of infringing goods.138
Exclusion orders may be limited—and apply only to
named parties—or general, applying as to the world.139 When at
least one respondent participates throughout an investigation
that results in a finding of a violation, the ITC may enter a
GEO following the required showing that “there is a pattern of
violation of this section and it is difficult to identify the source
of infringing products.”140 But complainants have a high bar to
prove the necessity of a GEO after all the respondents have
dropped out of the investigation through consent orders or
default.141 In that case, the ITC may enter a GEO only where a
violation of section 337 “is established by substantial, reliable,
and probative evidence.”142
C.

Absent Adversaries for Claim Construction at the ITC

The ITC rules on the scope and validity of patents absent
adversarial participation when it grants a GEO following the

137 Id. § 1337(d). Final exclusion orders (in addition to seizure and forfeiture
orders) are enforced by Customs at the relevant ports of entry. 19 C.F.R. § 12.39 (2015);
WALKER & SOUCIE, supra note 13, § 10:3. The Commission enforces cease and desist
orders and consent orders by assessing civil penalties or by filing for injunctive relief in
a federal district court. WALKER & SOUCIE, supra note 13, §§ 10.2, 10.5.
138 SCHAUMBERG, supra note 124, at 17.
139 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d). The ITC is no longer statutorily permitted to impose
penalty duties when it finds unlawful importation because that remedy was found to be
ineffectual as compared to orders of exclusion. S. Alex Lasher, The Evolution of the
Domestic Industry Requirement in Section 337 Investigations Before the United States
International Trade Commission, 18 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 157, 158-59 (2010)
(explaining penalty duties) (citing Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-318, 42 Stat. 858
(1922)). The ITC is no longer statutorily permitted to impose penalty duties when it
finds unlawful importation. When the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was passed in1930, the
President’s ability to levy penalty duties was eliminated, based on the Tariff
Commission’s finding that “[s]toppage of importation of infringing articles through an
order of exclusion from entry is the only effectual remedy.” U.S. TARIFF COMM’N,
TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION 21 (1928).
140 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2)(B); see also WALKER & SOUCIE, supra note 13, § 1.8.
The grant of GEOs is governed by section 337(d)(2), which was amended in 1994
following a GATT panel report limiting GEOs to particular circumstances. 19 C.F.R.
§ 210.50(c) (2015).
141 19 C.F.R. § 210.16(c)(2). A complainant may seek entry of specific relief
against defaulting respondents, similar to civil litigation. Id. § 210.16(c)(1).
142 Id. § 210.16(c)(2). In contrast, the Commission may terminate an investigation
without making a determination of violation of section 337 when the parties have all
entered into consent agreements or settlements. And it is the Commission’s practice to
terminate investigations without entering a GEO in cases where all respondents have
settled with the complainant. Certain Plastic Molding Machines With Control Systems
Having Programmable Operator Interfaces Incorporating General Purpose Computers, and
Components Thereof II, Inv. No. 337-TA-462, USITC Pub. 3609 (July 2003).
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default of all remaining parties to an investigation.143 Most cases
that result in a GEO are decided by an ALJ following briefing and
arguments by the complainant, named respondents, and
sometimes a staff attorney from the OUII. Thus, opposing parties
appear and present arguments about the proper scope of the
patent claims, in addition to arguing whether the patent is even
valid. When there are no respondents participating, there is the
potential for the entry of an LEO or a GEO. The defaulting
respondents may be subject to an LEO on the basis of the facts
alleged in the complaint. These orders apply only to defaulting
parties, similar to default rules in federal courts.144 While LEOs
include claim construction and infringement decisions reached
without the benefit of adversarial argument, they apply only to
named respondents who had notice and opportunity to appear
and contest the ruling but declined to do so. A GEO, in contrast,
applies against all products deemed to infringe, regardless of the
importer. For a system reliant on adversarial argument to reach
its outcomes, this is problematic.
The standard for obtaining a GEO absent adversaries is
higher than for an LEO. As one ALJ noted, a higher evidentiary
standard is required because it is “the only evidentiary assurance
that the [ITC] has in what is basically an ex parte proceeding that
relief is warranted against the entire world.”145 Still, in satisfying
the “substantial, reliable, and probative evidence” standard for
entering a GEO absent participation from any named
respondents, the complainant faces no adversary.146 The evidence
before the deciding ALJ must meet a higher standard, but it
remains unopposed.
Importantly, although the ALJ is entrusted with
performing claim construction and making infringement
determinations without the benefit of adversarial participation,
the judge is barred from considering—or ruling on—the validity of
a patent where no invalidity argument has been raised by a
143 19 C.F.R. § 210.16(c)(2). The regulations likely refer to default by the “last
remaining respondent” because of the practice of naming multiple respondents in an
investigation and because of the frequency of withdrawal through consent orders,
settlements, and notices of intention to default throughout the course of the
investigation. Id.
144 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 55 (covering default and default judgment in
federal courts).
145 Certain Sildenafil or any Pharmaceutically Acceptable Salt Thereof, Inv.
No. 337-TA-489 (Oct. 27, 2003) (Order No. 19: Initial Determination Granting in Part
& Denying in Part Complainant’s Motion for Summary Determination with Respect to
Domestic Indus. & Violation of Section 337 & Recommended Determination on Remedy
and Bonding).
146 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2)(B) (2012).
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party.147 Challenging the validity of asserted patents is one of the
important roles that adversaries in patent litigation play.148 In a
1993 investigation, an ALJ expressed frustration with this
inability to consider invalidity when it appeared to be relevant. In
that investigation, a named respondent had filed a brief
contesting the validity of the patent but had withdrawn the brief
pursuant to a settlement agreement.149 After noting that there
would be advantages to the complainant and respondent in
settling the litigation, the ALJ wrote, “I am not authorized to
consider issues relating to the public interest or remedy here (i.e.,
the question of whether monopolies based on patents that may or
may not be valid should be enforced by the [ITC] against anyone
other than the parties who . . . [settled]).”150 The ALJ’s discomfort,
it seems, came not from the settlement of named parties to the
dispute, but from the concern that the patent would be widely
enforced against nonparties without a determination of its
validity, even where that validity was questionable enough for a
respondent to file a motion arguing against it.
Even when validity is not an issue, claim construction is.
In order to meet the “substantial, reliable, and probative
evidence” standard for granting a GEO after all remaining
respondents have defaulted, the ALJ must make a finding of
infringement and follow the same two-step process used in
district courts, albeit sometimes within a single hearing.151 First,
the ALJ must determine the scope and meaning of asserted
claims; then, the products accused of infringing are compared to
the claims as construed.152
This situation of judges making claim-construction
determinations without adversarial participation—while ignoring
potential validity concerns—is theoretically problematic, but it
also has real world impact. For a sense of how frequently GEOs
147 Lannom Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 799 F. 2d 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (reversing Commission determination of invalidity in which no defense of
invalidity was raised by the parties).
148 See infra Section I.B.
149 Certain Devices for Connecting Computers via Tel. Lines, Inv. No. 337-TA360, USITC Pub. 2843 (May 25, 1994) (Initial Determination on Motion for Summary
Determination).
150 Id.
151 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2)(B). Some ALJs conduct a separate hearing and issue a
claim-construction order prior to the initial determination, while some choose to hear claim
construction and infringement arguments simultaneously. For a description of each ALJ’s
procedures, see Mark Tison, Did You Know How Claim Construction Is Handled In PatentBased Section 337 Investigations?, ITC 337 L. BLOG, http://www.itcblog.com/did-you-knowhow-claim-construction-is-handled-in-patent-based-section-337-investigations [http://perma.
cc/DRP6-URG5] (last visited May 17, 2016).
152 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996).
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are issued absent adversarial argument, consider the following
statistics: of 929 completed investigations at the ITC, 102
investigations, or about 11%, have resulted in GEOs for patent
infringement.153 Of those 102 GEOs, approximately 31 have been
entered in proceedings where all of the named respondents have
defaulted or exited the investigation through some sort of
agreement prior to claim construction.154
153 Numbers were derived from searches on the ITC website and confirmed
through Westlaw searches, updated as of November 9, 2015. Results available from author.
154 These investigations include those predating the 1988 requirement that
GEOs entered following the default of all respondents meet higher evidentiary
standards, and they include investigations in which a party is not formally declared in
default but did not participate. It does not include investigations in which there was
participation in arguments. It does not include investigations in which respondents
participated in claim construction and defaulted later, immediately prior to the GEO.
This choice is made in order to capture those cases in which no adversarial positions
were argued in the course of the ALJ’s claim-construction decision. The investigations
are: Certain Cases for Portable Electronic Devices, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-867/861
(July 10, 2014) (Commission Opinion) (Consolidated); Certain Lighting Control Devices
Including Dimmer Switches and Parts Therof (IV), Inv. No. 337-TA-776, USITC Pub.
4403 (June 7, 2012) (Order No. 18: Initial Determination Granting in Part Motion by
Complainant Lutron Electronics Co., Inc. for Summary Determination of Violation of
Section 337 and Recommended Determination on Remedy); Certain Toner Cartridges
and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-740, USITC Pub. 4376 (June 11, 2011)
(Order 26: Initial Determination Granting Complainant Lexmark International, Inc.’s
Motion for Summary Determination on Violations of Section 337 by Defaulting
Respondents); Certain Inkjet Ink Supplies and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA730 (Aug. 3, 2011) (Order No. 14: Initial Determination Granting Complainant’s
Motion for Summary Determination That a Domestic Industry Exists and That There
Have Been Violations of Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (Amended) by the
Defaulting Respondents and Complainants’ Request for a General Exclusion Order);
Certain Electronic Paper Towel Dispensing Devices and Components Thereof, Inv. No.
337-TA-718, USITC Pub. 4359 (July 12, 2011) (Order No. 36: Initial Determination
Granting Complainant’s Motion for Summary Determination of Violation of Section
337 by Defaulting Respondents; and Recommended Determination on the Issues of
Remedy and Bond with Respect to Defaulting Respondents); Certain Inkjet Ink
Supplies and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-691, USITC Pub. 4290 (Nov. 2011);
Certain Tadalafil or Any Salt or Solvate Thereof and Products Containing Same, Inv.
No. 337-TA-539 (June 13, 2006) (General Exclusion Order); Certain Plastic Food
Containers, Inv. No. 337-TA-514 (May 23, 2005) (General Exclusion Order); Certain
Plastic Grocery and Retail Bags, Inv. No. 337-TA-492 (Mar. 30, 2004); Certain
Sildenafil or Any Pharmaceutically Acceptable Salt Thereof, Such as Sildenafil Citrate,
and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-489 (Oct. 27, 2003) (Order No. 19:
Initial Determination Granting in Part and Denying in Part Complainant’s Motion for
Summary Determination with Respect to Domestic Industry and Violation of Section
337 and Recommended Determination on Remedy and Bonding); Certain BatteryPowered Ride-On Toy Vehicles and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-314, Pub.
2420 (Apr. 9, 1991) (Notice of Issuance of Exclusion Order); Certain Strip Lights, Inv.
No. 337-TA-287 (Sept. 28, 1989) (Exclusion Order); Certain Chemiluminescent
Compositions and Components Thereof and Methods of Using, and Products
Incorporating, the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-285, USITC Pub. 2370 (Aug. 17, 1991)
(Notice of Issuance of General Exclusion Order); Certain Minoxidil Powder, Salts and
Compositions for Use in Hair Treatment, Inv. No 337-TA-267 (Feb. 16, 1988) (Initial
Determination); Certain Reclosable Plastic Bags and Tubing, Inv. No. 337-TA-266,
USITC Pub. 2239 (May 25, 1989) (Initial Advisory Opinion); Certain Feathered Fur
Coats and Pelts, and Process for the Manufacture Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-260, USITC
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Although these investigations are missing an adversary,
the decisions are not made entirely without representation of the
public interest. The ITC maintains the OUII, which is meant to
operate as an independent litigant in some ITC investigations
with the purpose of protecting the public interest, including the
creation of a complete record on all contested issues.155 The OUII
does not assign an investigative attorney to every investigation.
But when a complainant requests a GEO following the default of
all remaining parties, an investigative attorney is generally
assigned to participate, presumably because of the importance of
the remedy issue in those investigations. In general, the OUII
focuses on cases that particularly implicate the public interest,
bring up complex issues relating to the existence of a domestic
industry, or require extra analysis of the appropriate remedy.156
And ALJs are very open to investigative attorneys’ arguments.157
But while the investigative attorney provides another voice in
proceedings that would otherwise only have briefing from the
Pub. 2085 (Sept. 24, 1987) (Initial Determination); Multi-Level Touch Control Lighting
Switches, Inv. No. 337-TA-225 (July 16, 1987) (Commission Opinion); Certain
Apparatus for Installing Electrical Lines and Components Therefor, Inv. No. 337-TA196, USITC Pub. 1858 (Dec. 27, 1984) (Order No. 5: Initial Determination Finding Two
Respondents in Default and Granting in Part Complainant’s Motion for Summary
Determination); Certain Foam Earplugs, Inv. No. 337-TA-184, USITC Pub. 1671 (Mar.
4, 1985) (Commission Action and Order); Certain Indomethacin, Inv. No 337-TA-183
(Aug. 13, 1986) (Initial Determination After Remand); Certain Woodworking Machines,
Inv. No. 337-TA-174, USITC Pub. 1979 (Feb. 6, 1985) (Initial Determination); Certain
Miniature Plug-In Blade Fuses, Inv. No. 337-TA-114, USITC Pub. 1983 (Jan. 13, 1983)
(Commission Action and Order); Certain Methods for Extruding Plastic Tubing, Inv.
No. 337-TA-110, USITC Pub. 1287 (Sept. 2, 1982) (Commission Action and Order);
Certain Window Shades and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-83, USITC Pub.
1152 (May 1981) (Commission Action and Order); Certain Rotatable Photograph and
Card Display Units, and Components Therefor, Inv. No 337-TA-74, USITC Pub. 1109
(Nov. 21, 1980) (Commission Determination and Order); Certain Rotary Scraping
Tools, Inv. No. 337-TA-62, USITC Pub. 1027 (Jan. 10, 1980) (Commission
Determination, Order, and Opinion); Certain Pump Top Insulated Containers, Inv. No.
337-TA-59, USITC Pub. 1010 (Nov. 9, 1979) (Commission Determination, Order, and
Opinion); Certain Flexible Foam Sandals, Inv. No. 337-TA-47, USITC Pub. 947 (Feb.
21, 1979) (Commission Determination, Order, and Memorandum Opinion); Certain
Roller Units, Inv. No. 337-TA-44, USITC Pub. 944 (Feb. 14, 1979) (Commission
Determination, and Action); Certain Electric Slow Cookers, Inv. No. 337-TA-42, USITC
Pub. 994 (Aug. 9, 1979) (Commission Determination, Order, and Opinion).
155 WALKER & SOUCIE, supra note 13, §§ 2:3, 4:33. For a proposal to use
“neutral third party litigants” such as the OUII staff attorneys in patent litigation
more broadly, see Jeremy W. Bock, Neutral Litigants in Patent Cases, 15 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. 233, 250-51 (2014).
156 MARK K. NEVILLE, JR., INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES ¶ 13.02 (2013), 2013 WL 5356725.
157 In one study, not limited to complainants seeking GEOs or missing active
respondents, ALJs were found to agree with staff attorney positions 80% of the time.
Jerold B. Murphy, A Statistical Comparison of the Staff Attorneys’ Positions on
Disputed Issues and the Administrative Law Judges’ Decisions on Such Issues, 21 337
REP. 53, 54 (2005) (examining 7 initial decisions with 90 distinct issues).
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complainant, this presence does not truly solve the problem of
the missing adversary. For one thing, the investigative attorney
does not independently develop evidence, but rather gives
opinions on the reliability of the evidence that is put forth.
Moreover, the investigative attorney is not meant to be an
opposing party to the complainant (or to any named
respondents), but rather is entirely independent.
Investigative attorney briefing does not take the place of
arguments a private party might otherwise put forth in litigation
to narrow the scope of a patent, as is clear from a review of those
cases. In many of the cases that resulted in a GEO following
default of remaining respondents, the investigative attorney did
not argue for a different claim construction from that put forth by
the complainant.158 Because the ALJ is only required to construe
claims that are “in controversy,” there is less likelihood of indepth claim construction when there is no other interested party
to a proceeding and the investigative attorney is amenable to the
complainant’s arguments.159 Where the investigative attorney did
disagree, the ALJ considered their arguments, sometimes
agreeing with the investigative attorney,160 sometimes with the
complainant,161 and sometimes coming to a different meaning
158 See, e.g., Certain Strip Lights, Inv. No. 337-TA-287 (June 27, 1989) (Initial
Determination) (citing to the investigative attorney’s briefing and exhibits and finding no
disagreement on claim term meaning); Certain Devices for Connecting Computers Via
Telephone Lines, Inv. No. 337-TA-360, USITC Pub. 2843 (May 24, 1994) (Initial
Determination on Motion for Summary Determination) (essentially adopting complainant’s
expert report on claim construction and infringement); Certain Toner Cartridges &
Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-740, USITC Pub. 4376 (June 1, 2011) (Initial
Determination) (adopting the expert report by reference following investigative attorney’s
agreement on all issues); Certain Chemiluminescent Compositions & Components Thereof
& Methods of Using, & Products Incorporating, the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-285, USITC Pub.
2370 (Mar. 22, 1989) (Initial Determination) (adopting expert report where investigative
attorney agrees there is no genuine issue).
159 Vanderlande Indus. Nederland BV v. Int’l Trade Comm’n., 366 F.3d 1311, 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2004); Certain Inkjet Ink Supplies & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-730
(Aug. 3, 2011) (Order No. 14: Initial Determination Granting Complainants Motion for
Summary Determination That a Domestic Industry Exists and That There Have Been
Violations of Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (Amended) by the Defaulting Respondents
and Complainants Request for a General Exclusion Order) (following Verlande in a section
337 investigation with no participating respondents and recommending entry of a GEO).
160 See, e.g., Certain Inkjet Ink Supplies & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337TA-730 (Aug. 3, 2011) (Order No. 14: Initial Determination Granting Complainants
Motion for Summary Determination That a Domestic Indus. Exists & That There Have
Been Violations of Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (Amended) by the Defaulting
Respondents & Complainants Request for a General Exclusion Order) (agreeing with
the investigative attorney and rejecting complainant Hewlett Packard’s construction of
“interface package”).
161 Certain Toner Cartridges & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-829
(Feb. 28, 2013) (Order No. 25: Initial Determination) (siding with the OUII on two
claim terms and with complainant Canon on the third disputed term).
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entirely.162 All of these outcomes are contemplated in the
adversarial model, where the process of arguing both sides of a
dispute leads a judge to a fuller understanding and possibly more
nuanced view than an inquisitorial-style process might produce.
Disputes between the investigative attorney and complainant,
however, are infrequent compared to the number of disputed
terms in typical patent infringement disputes—whether at the
ITC or in federal district court.163
This critique is not to suggest that either the ALJs or the
investigative attorneys assigned to investigations are not
performing their duties. Rather, the problem arises because
parties with real interests are absent from the proceedings.
Investigative attorneys do not have access to information about
many types of infringing goods, so developing relevant arguments
to appropriately narrow the scope of claims is nearly impossible.
This is coupled with an inability to challenge validity—a type of
challenge that is often easier to develop based on a closed record.
The result is that patent claims are generally construed and
applied in an adversarial vacuum.
D.

Absent Adversaries for Customs Enforcement

The second instance of claim construction absent
adversaries occurs in the enforcement of GEOs against nonparties
to the original investigation. Following a finding of infringement
by named parties (and other necessary findings),164 the ITC may
enter a GEO. A typical order includes a statement that “the
Commission has determined that a general exclusion order from
162 Certain Lighting Control Devices Including Dimmer Switches & Parts
Thereof (IV), Inv. No. 337-TA-776, USITC Pub. 4403 (Oct. 17, 2012) (Final Commission
Determination of Violation) (rejecting investigative attorney and complainant positions
on claim construction and finding infringement of all asserted claims except for one
that was inexplicably left out of complainant’s expert report).
163 See James R. Barney & Charles T. Collins-Chase, An Empirical Analysis of
District Court Claim Construction Decisions, January to December 2009, 2011 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 2, 9 (2011) (showing the average number of claim terms in dispute in
each district in the year 2009, with an average of 13.1 claim terms in dispute per case
in the district that issued the most claim-construction decisions that year. That district
was the Eastern District of Texas, which issued 55 decisions on claim construction.
Overall, the authors analyzed 211 district court decisions construing 1,858 disputed
claim terms, making an average of 8.8 claim terms in dispute per case). In contrast, the
investigations examined for this article in which claims were construed without
adverse parties present and a GEO was entered, there tended to be between zero and
three claim terms that were disputed by the OUII’s investigative attorney.
164 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2) (2012) (requiring findings that a GEO is “necessary
to prevent circumvention of an exclusion order limited to products of named persons” or
that “there is a pattern of violation of this section and it is difficult to identify the
source of infringing products”).
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entry for consumption is necessary to prevent circumvention of an
exclusion order limited to products of named persons because
there is a pattern of violation of section 337 and it is difficult to
identify the source of infringing products.”165 Because the orders
do not apply to specific, infringing goods, the order is written only
in terms of the patents at issue. Thus, a representative GEO
provides, “Lighting control devices including dimmer switches
and parts thereof covered by one or more of [specifying claims in a
patent] are excluded from entry into the United States for
consumption . . . for the remaining terms of the patent, except
under license of the patent owner or as provided by law.”166
Customs enforces ITC exclusion orders issued pursuant to
section 337 proceedings.167 To effect this, the ITC notifies the
Secretary of the Treasury of the order.168 The Secretary of the
Treasury then disseminates the order within Customs and its
“Regional Commissioners, District and Area Directors,” with
direction to “[deny] entry of all importations of articles covered by
the exclusion order except, in patent cases, where a license from
the patent owner is presented by the importer.”169 The ITC also
provides Customs with a brief description of the product involved,
Harmonized Tariff Schedule tariff number(s) of the product
involved, and other information that aids in identifying infringing
goods.170 Customs has an Intellectual Property Rights Branch
that prepares an “exclusion order notice” to be disseminated to
various ports of entry to aid field officers in identifying articles
165 Certain Lighting Control Devices Including Dimmer Switches & Parts
Thereof (IV), Inv. No. 337-TA-776, USITC Pub. 4403 (Oct. 17, 2012) (General Exclusion
Order); see, e.g., Certain Recordable Compact Discs & Rewritable Compact Discs, Inv.
No. 337-TA-474, USITC Pub. 3686 (Apr. 2004). Underlying infringement claims
reversed by U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
166 Certain Lighting Control Devices Including Dimmer Switches & Parts Thereof
(IV), Inv. No. 337-TA-776, USITC Pub. 4403 (Oct. 17, 2012) (General Exclusion Order).
167 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(e). In addition, some imports may be stopped by
Customs for infringement of trademark or copyright laws without a section 337
proceeding. Registered trademarks or copyrights may be recorded with Customs upon
the submission of an application that includes information about authorized or licensed
users and manufacturers of the goods, after which Customs will exclude goods it
considers to infringe the marks, requiring importers to challenge and prove their
authorization for importation. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (2015). In particular, 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21 provides that “CBP may detain any article of domestic or foreign manufacture
imported into the United States that bears a mark suspected of being a counterfeit
version of a mark that is registered . . . and is recorded with CBP.”
168 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(e) (2004).
169 DONALD K. DUVALL, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE ITC: ACTIONS BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER SECTION 337 OF THE TARIFF ACT OF
1930, at 660 (1995).
170 See id.
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under exclusion orders.171 Ultimately, to enforce GEOs, Customs
must perform infringement analysis at the border to determine if
goods infringe the relevant patents—as construed by the ITC.172
Importers potentially subject to exclusion of goods under a
GEO have two avenues for protest. One of those avenues does not
raise concerns about absent adversaries, although it is
procedurally problematic; the other excludes one of the
adversaries. In the first, importers concerned that their goods
might wrongly be excluded under a GEO can request an advisory
opinion from the ITC that their goods do not infringe.173 These
proceedings include the original complainant and an investigative
attorney and allow for further claim construction if necessary
before making an infringement determination. For example, in
one investigation, the ITC construed the term “nozzle” to include
a limitation of “wide lips” in its initial determination.174 Following
a request for an advisory opinion, the ITC further construed the
term “nozzle” and found that the precise dimensions in the patent
specification determined what “wide lips” meant and that the goods
at issue did not infringe under that construction.175 Although the
advisory opinion proceedings include both interested parties, and
therefore do not raise concerns about missing adversaries, they are
171 Jamie Beaber, Enforcement of US International Trade Commission
Exclusion Orders, ASPATORE, Dec. 2012, 2012 WL 5899382, at *4.
172 According to practitioners, patent holders may visit Customs field officers at
ports and educate them on how to identify infringing goods when those goods are highly
technical. Id. at *7 n.29; see also JON C. EVANS & RIC MACCHIAROLI, JONES DAY, ITC
REMEDIAL ORDERS IN THE REAL WORLD (2015), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/
1237eed8-9556-430a-acff-971d9c188dc9/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3242b57d-4f
d0-4c98-90dd-9c7e290ad8a6/ITC%20Remedial%20Orders.pdf [http://perma.cc/X7SB-8TQ2]
(suggesting that “the complainant should meet with Customs to provide industry
information and intelligence to the field agents who will enforce the terms of the order”
and giving examples of helpful information such as “established ports of entry, known
and suspected importers, the identity of articles subject to exclusion . . . methods of
infringement testing, and the technology at issue”).
173 19 C.F.R.§ 210.79 (2015); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (k) (2012). For example,
in September 2011, a nonrespondent requested an advisory opinion that its connectors
were outside the scope of a GEO. The Commission reviewed goods and submissions
from the nonrespondent, from original complainant PPC, and from the Commission’s
Investigative attorney, and rendered its opinion that the products submitted were not
covered by the GEO. Certain Coaxial Cable Connectors and Components Thereof and
Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-650, USITC Pub. 4283 (Feb. 9, 2012)
(Advisory Opinion).
174 Certain Amorphous Metal Alloys and Amorphous Metal Articles, Inv. No.
337-4A-143, USITC Pub. 1664 (May 14, 1984) (Initial Determination); 49 Fed. Reg.
42,083 (Oct. 24, 1984).
175 Certain Amorphous Metal Alloys and Amorphous Metal Articles, Inv. No.
337-TA-143, USITC Pub. 2036 (June 17, 1987) (Commission Action and Order)
(construing the patent claims and holding that in order to literally infringe the claims
of the ‘257 patent, the front lip of the nozzle must be “from at least 1.45 to 1.55 times
the width of the nozzle slot”).
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not considered “final determinations” and thus are not subject to
review by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.176 This
process allows importers who were not parties to the original
investigation an opportunity to be heard; because it is not
appealable, however, that opportunity is limited.
The second avenue importers have to dispute the
application of an exclusion order to their goods is filing a
Customs protest.177 If Customs excludes goods at the border,
the importer may file a protest with Customs, and if denied,
may file a civil suit in the U.S. Court of International Trade
(USCIT) to dispute Customs’s application of the GEO to its
goods.178 The proceeding at the USCIT is between the importer
and Customs, and no other person is permitted to intervene,
including the patent holder.179
A recent case highlights the potential problems with this
avenue from an adversarial process viewpoint. John
Mezzalingua Associates, Inc. filed a complaint with the ITC in
May 2008, naming eight respondents who allegedly were
importing for sale in the United States coaxial cables that
infringed four patents.180 In March 2010, the ITC issued an LEO
against a number of defaulting defendants for infringement of a
design patent and a GEO for coaxial cable connectors that
infringe claim 1 and/or 2 of one of the utility patents in suit.181
176 Allied Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 850 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
In some investigations, such as the one at issue in Allied Corp., the Commission will modify
the original exclusion order following the advisory opinion proceedings in order to clarify its
scope. Id. at 1581; Amorphous Metal Alloys and Amorphous Metal Articles, Inv. No. 337TA-143, Pub. 2035 (May 28, 1987) (Advisory Opinion) (modifying scope of exclusion order). A
scope modification is appealable. Allied Corp., 850 F.2d at 1579-80.
177 Matters Subject to Protest, 19 C.F.R. § 174.11(b)(4) (2011). The AIPLA has
expressed concern about Customs procedures when evaluating whether design-around
technology infringes. American Intellectual Property Law Association, Comment Letter
on “Interagency Review of Exclusion Order Enforcement Process,” 78 Fed. Reg. 37,242
(July 20, 2013).
178 19 C.F.R. § 174.11(b)(4) (2015); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(a), 2636(a) (2012).
179 WALKER & SOUCIE, supra note 13, § 10:3; Corning Gilbert, Inc. v. United
States, 896 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013).
180 See Certain Coaxial Cable Connectors and Components Thereof and
Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-650, USITC Pub. 4283 (Mar. 13, 2010);
Notice of Investigation, 73 Fed. Reg. 31,145 (May 30, 2008).
181 Certain Coaxial Cable Connectors and Components Thereof and Products
Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-650, USITC Pub. 4283 (Mar. 13, 2010) (Notice of
Commission Issuance of a General Exclusion Order and a Remand Order; Extension of
Target Date) (“The limited exclusion order prohibits the unlicensed entry of coaxial cable
connectors and components thereof and products containing the same that infringe the
claim of the ‘076 design patent and are manufactured abroad by or on behalf of, or imported
by or on behalf of, any of the defaulting respondents. The general exclusion order prohibits
the unlicensed entry of coaxial cable connectors and components thereof and products
containing the same that infringe claim 1 and/or 2 of the ‘194 patent.”).
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Following an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit on the issue of domestic industry, the other asserted
utility patent was also found to be infringed, and a GEO was
entered for those asserted claims as well.182
In 2010, Customs denied entry to various coaxial cable
connecters imported by Corning Gilbert that Customs had
determined were subject to a GEO.183 Corning Gilbert was not a
named respondent, although it and Mezzalingua had previously
been involved in patent infringement litigation in federal district
court. Corning Gilbert protested the denial and appealed the
decision through Customs. Corning Gilbert lost its appeal and
brought suit against Customs in the USCIT, challenging Customs’s
denial of Corning Gilbert’s protests. Because the suit was between
the importer and Customs, the patent holder, Mezzalingua, was
not a party.184 The court noted that its jurisdiction over the appeal
from a protest denial derived from section 1581(a) of its governing
statute, which is important for two reasons.185 First, it meant that
intervention by Mezzalingua was expressly disallowed by
statute.186 In addition, it meant that the court reviewed Customs’s
decision de novo, based on a record developed for the proceeding.187
Moreover, the USCIT denied Mezzalingua’s motion to participate
as amicus curiae.188 In doing so, the court stated that it was wary
that Mezzalingua’s participation as amicus curiae might be

182 Certain Coaxial Cable Connectors and Components Thereof and Products
Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-650, USITC Pub. 4283 (Sept. 13, 2011) (Notice of
Issuance if a General Exclusion Order for U.S. Patent No. 5,470,257). Although the
defaulting respondents were found to infringe, there was no limited exclusion order. Id.
183 “The general exclusion order prohibits the unlicensed entry of coaxial cable
connectors and components thereof and products containing the same that infringe
claim 1 and/or 2 of the ‘194 patent.” Coaxial Cable Connectors and Components Thereof
and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-650, USITC Pub. 4283 (Mar. 31, 2010)
(Notice of Commission Issuance of a General Exclusion Order, a Limited Exclusion
Order, and a Remand Order; Extension of Target Date).
184 WALKER & SOUCIE, supra note 13, § 10:4, at 417 (noting that “Customs
officials are often forced to make their own determinations on highly technical issues
like claim construction and patent infringement without the input of either the ITC or
ITC complainants” and under tight deadlines because “Customs must review and
decide protests within 30 days of their filing”).
185 Corning Gilbert, Inc. v. United States, No. 11-00511, slip op. 12-62 (Ct.
Int’l Trade May 14, 2012).
186 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1)(A) (2006)).
187 In contrast, when the court exercises its review under section 1581(i), a
provision granting residual jurisdiction over trade-related suits not enumerated in 19
U.S.C. § 1514(a) (2012), it does so according to the Administrative Procedure Act, based
on the record developed in the agency and with appropriate deference to its decisions.
Justin R. Miller, The Interplay of Jurisdiction Between 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) and
§ 1581(i), 21 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 439, 439-41 (2013).
188 Corning Gilbert Corp., slip op. 12-62.
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considered a substitute for intervention, which is expressly
forbidden in protest denial actions by the governing statute.189
It is particularly striking that the case proceeded without
the involvement of the patent holder, because the court found that
the claim construction performed at the ITC was insufficient to
determine if Corning Gilbert’s imports infringed.190 As a result,
the USCIT construed the claim language “cylindrical body
member” without any input from the patent holder.191 The proper
construction of the claim term at issue was not undertaken at the
ITC when the patent holder was present; as the court explained,
“[t]he ITC did not construe the claims of the ‘194 Patent because
no party contested the terms comprising those claims during
the . . . Investigation.”192 Instead of participation from the two
interested parties, it was Customs that was left to argue for a claim
construction that would result in a finding of infringement.193 While
Corning Gilbert submitted expert testimony that the court found
persuasive, the government submitted no expert reports.194 Based
on its claim construction, the court found that Corning Gilbert’s
goods did not infringe the patent and therefore fell outside the
scope of the exclusion order.195
The Corning Gilbert case demonstrates that there is
some symmetry to the problem of absent adversaries. The court
determined the scope and content of patent rights following the
typical rules and procedures for an adversarial process, but the
“adversary”—in this case Customs—had at most an ancillary
interest in the outcome. Customs’s interest was in defending its
decision based on the materials it had, not in developing new
arguments and evidence to support an infringement argument.
In the meantime, the patent holder—with a financial interest

189 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1)(A) (2006), which provides that anyone
“who would be adversely affected . . . by a decision in a civil action pending in the Court
of International Trade may, by leave of court, intervene in such an action, except
that—(A) no person may intervene in a civil action under section 515 or 516 of the
Tariff At of 1930”).
190 Corning Gilbert, Inc. v. United States, 896 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1290 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2013) (“On the record before the court, there is no evidence to support the
Government’s contention that the ITC made findings requiring a conclusion that the
Excluded Connectors infringe the claims of the ‘194 Patent.”).
191 Id. at 1292.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1293 (“The substantive difference between the parties’ proposed
constructions for the claim term ‘cylindrical body member’ is Corning Gilbert’s emphasis on,
and the Government’s omission of, the requirement that the body surround the post to
create a bore to receive the cable jacket.”).
194 Id. at 1292.
195 Id. at 1295-97.
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in the outcome of the case and incentives to litigate its
position—was absent.
Any solution to the problem of absent adversaries in
section 337 proceedings should take into account both sides of
this puzzle: missing competitors at the ITC and missing rights
holders during enforcement.
E.

The Impact of Absent Adversaries at the ITC

Critiques of the adversarial system are most prescient
when parties are not equally represented and where the private
parties are standing in for public interests.196 Allowing
proceedings to move forward without one of the interested parties
is about as unequal as it gets. Moreover, parties to patent
litigation represent interests beyond their own.197 When an ITC
investigation results in a GEO, the outcome of the dispute directly
affects other importers and indirectly affects consumers who have
no access to goods that have been denied entry at the border. The
first way claim-construction determinations are made without
representatives of adverse interests is in ITC investigations in
which all parties default, and yet a GEO is entered. The second
way adversarial arguments are excluded from claim-construction
determinations is when an importer challenges a Customs
decision to exclude goods pursuant to a GEO because patent
holders are barred from participating. These circumstances raise
a fortiorari the concerns and critiques of the adversarial system in
general, as discussed above.198
The truth-seeking aim of the adversarial system is
severely compromised when it lacks robust argument from one
side. Without a potential infringer to raise invalidity concerns, the
ITC is unable to consider the issue.199 Proceeding as though there
is an adversarial process when one does not exist constrains the
judge hearing the case from making certain inquiries. Aside from
the validity of the patent, an accused infringer generally argues
for a narrow interpretation of a patent to avoid infringement,
presenting its own evidence and expert witnesses to argue how
one skilled in the art would interpret the claims. Although the
investigative attorney in ITC proceedings plays a role in
challenging some of the patent holder’s arguments, she does not
bring her own evidence, nor is she tasked with seeking to narrow
196
197
198
199

See supra Section I.B.
See supra Section I.B.
See supra Section I.A.
See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
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patents. As a result, the patent holder’s arguments are not
balanced by arguments from another side, and the benefits to
truth seeking that are meant to come from presenting a judge
with robustly argued, opposing arguments are lost.
Similarly, when an importer is able to seek further claim
construction through challenges to Customs and the patent
holder is not allowed to intervene, the truth-seeking function of
the adversarial system is compromised. Although Customs
appears in challenges before the USCIT, it has no vested interest
in its claim construction or infringement arguments. It has
attempted to implement the claim-construction ruling made by
the ITC but has no greater purpose of ensuring a broad
construction than does the patent holder.
There is an economic efficiency argument that parallels
the truth-seeking point, and it is fairly straightforward given the
complete absence of one party. One critique of the adversarial
system is that parties with disparate wealth will behave
strategically in litigation rather than consensually determining
the issues that are most important to resolving a dispute. While
there is no need for strategic behavior when there is no opposing
party, it is also unlikely that an optimal amount of discovery will
occur. Instead, a patent holder at the ITC is likely to bring the
minimum amount of evidence necessary to prove her case. And
because there are not robust opposing arguments, the patent
holder will not need to bring any additional evidence to refute
those arguments. This may be a small win in that it conserves
some resources; however, the cost of that win may be the accuracy
of any resulting ruling.
The procedural safeguards that are touted in the
adversarial system are clearly not in force when rights are
decided without the appearance of interested parties. Importers
not party to an ITC investigation may still be impacted by the
claim construction performed there if a GEO results. There are
some justifications for GEOs that relate to the difficulty of
preventing the circumvention of LEOs, but these justifications do
little to address importers’ concerns that their goods will be
excluded from entry on the basis of patent claims that they have
not been allowed to challenge. For these importers, the
presumption that the state will not interfere with their ownership
rights without certain procedural protections is inverted,
requiring them to challenge Customs in order to prove that their
goods do not infringe and should be allowed entry. This inversion
compromises the adversarial system’s supposed role as a check on
the state’s ability to remove goods without procedural protections.
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Similarly, in instances where the patent holder is not allowed to
participate in proceedings that include claim-construction
determinations, the procedural protections of the adversarial
system appear to be absent. The scope of the patent holder’s
rights are being determined without her participation.
The absence of adversaries calls into question the truthseeking and procedural fairness aims of the adversarial
system. These goals rely on the robust participation of parties
with adverse interests. When one of those parties is missing,
the accuracy and fairness of resulting decisions is at risk.
III.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: INCREASING OPPORTUNITIES FOR
ADVERSARIAL CHALLENGES OR EMBRACING A MORE
INQUISITORIAL STYLE

There are various potential solutions to the situations
identified by this article—namely, the use of undercontested
patent claims in injunctive relief with far-reaching effects. These
potential solutions include raising the standards for granting a
GEO, encouraging participation of all parties in postissuance
challenges at Customs or the ITC, and shifting to an inquisitorial
style of adjudication when patent adversaries are absent. The
most efficient solution would recognize the necessity of
challenging GEOs issued absent adversaries by increasing ITC
adjudicatory powers over exclusion challenges.
A.

Increasing Opportunities for Adversarial Challenges to
Section 337 Relief

Although the statute already requires a higher standard
of proof for entering a GEO following default by all remaining
parties than it does for entering an LEO solely against the
defaulting parties, the standard could be further heightened
either by amending the statute or by simply interpreting the
requirements of “substantial, reliable, and probative evidence”
differently. A higher standard is intuitively appealing because
it makes a judgment adverse to the interests of nonparties less
likely, potentially resolving fairness concerns. The problem
with this approach is that it is not tailored to the problem of
absent adversaries—it might ensure fewer GEOs, but it is
unclear how it could ensure better claim construction. It would
not, for example, solve the difficulty of discerning the truth
absent counterarguments and evidence countering the patent
holder’s position. In short, raising the standard for a GEO
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might change outcomes, but perhaps not the right outcomes,
and perhaps not in the right way.
A more promising possibility starts by recognizing the
limitations of arguments absent adversaries and the resulting,
necessarily pro forma nature of GEO determinations following
the default of remaining parties. This recognition should be
coupled with a more robust opportunity for challenges at the
ITC during the implementation of exclusion orders.
The current standard under the statute, that the need for
a GEO following default be established by “substantial, reliable,
and probative evidence,” is rightfully a higher standard than for
an LEO following default, in that it both requires that a patent
holder allege all necessary facts to show infringement and the
need for relief and tests the sufficiency of the patent holder’s
evidence. It makes sense to increase scrutiny before applying
what is essentially a default judgment to nonparties. Yet, as
discussed above, without an adversary to help identify relevant
areas of dispute or to develop and present new evidence (such as
expert testimony), this process remains lacking. Once Customs
excludes a nonparty importer’s goods pursuant to a GEO,
however, an adverse party has been identified, opening up the
opportunity for the ITC to revisit its determination with the
benefit of adversarial argument.
The idea of expanding post-exclusion-order patent disputes
in order to allow for adversarial processes is slowly gaining
traction, both at the ITC and Customs. It was one possibility raised
in a notice issued by the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement
Coordinator in June 2013, which solicited comments from
stakeholders.200 The responses suggested an increased role for
patent holders in identifying potentially infringing goods to
Customs and increased transparency from Customs in its
exclusion decisions. But there is room and necessity for greater
participation from interested importers, as well. Some suggest
that Customs, rather than the ITC, ought to develop an
adversarial process to hear from importers affected by GEOs and
patent holders before determining infringement.201 And there has
200 Request for Public Comments: Interagency Review of Exclusion Order
Enforcement Process, 78 Fed. Reg. 37,242 (June 20, 2013). The notice was one part of an
interagency effort aimed in part towards “improv[ing] the effectiveness of directions
provided by the ITC to assist [Customs] with the challenges of enforcement.” U.S.
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENF’T COORDINATOR, 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 17 (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
IPEC/2013-us-ipec-joint-strategic-plan.pdf [http://perma.cc/44TV-7L68].
201 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE,
U.S. SENATE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
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been some progress on that front.202 Further expanding Customs’s
role would be inefficient, however, given that ALJs at the ITC will
already be familiar with the relevant patents and technology. It
would add another layer of litigation, whereas a return to the ITC
would serve as a delayed judgment on issues that were not fully
ripe at the time of the initial ruling.
The ITC may be amenable to greater involvement in postexclusion-order litigation. In February 2015, the ITC implemented
its Pilot Program for Rulings on Redesigned Products in
Commission Post-Order Proceedings.203 The program is primarily
meant to provide expedited review of new or redesigned products
that an importer contends do not violate an exclusion order. The
announcement also underscores that importers not party to the
initial investigation may avail themselves of the ITC’s jurisdiction
for infringement opinions—and that these proceedings are inter
partes.204 By expediting the proceedings, the ITC makes its
advisory ruling process more attractive, increasing the likelihood
that importers might challenge a GEO’s application to their goods
ex ante, rather than waiting and challenging exclusion through
Customs, after paying to ship goods to the United States and
while they are being held. Still, it does not solve the problem for
those nonparty importers whose goods are seized at the border
and who currently must argue the decisions with Customs, rather
than with the ITC—the agency that originally construed the
claims and has knowledge of the case.
In short, the ITC’s jurisdiction could be further expanded
so that disputed exclusion orders from Customs were routed back
through the ITC upon identification—by the agency or by the
importer—of legal and factual questions that would benefit from
COULD BETTER MANAGE ITS PROCESS TO ENFORCE EXCLUSION ORDERS 21 (2014),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667074.pdf [http://perma.cc/5YWA-WVR8] (“Currently,
CBP’s administrative ruling process is an ex parte process where only the importer
requesting the ruling participates in the process, not the complainants in the original
case that resulted in the exclusion order. IPR Branch officials told us that they are
developing a proposal for an inter partes process within CBP’s administrative ruling
process that would enable the complainant as well as the importer that has requested a
ruling to provide information before CBP issues its administrative ruling on the
product. The proposed process would allow both the complainant and the importer to
make arguments and rebut those of the other party.”).
202 See id. at 20.
203 Pilot Program Will Test Expedited Procedures for USITC Modification and
Advisory Opinion Proceedings, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/
featured_news/pilot_program_will_test_expedited_procedures_usitc.htm [http://perma.cc/7X
V7-U6LZ] (last visited May 17, 2016).
204 U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, USITC PILOT PROGRAM FOR RULINGS ON
REDESIGNED PRODUCTS IN COMMISSION POST-ORDER PROCEEDINGS: BACKGROUND AND
FACTS DOCUMENT, http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/documents/featured_news/337mod
procpilot_fs_final.doc [http://perma.cc/RJ47-BPF6] (last visited May 18, 2016).
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adversarial argument there. This would allow Customs to avoid
situations like that leading to the Corning Gilbert decision, where
the agency expended its resources defending a claim-construction
opinion in which it had no role.
Expanding postrelief proceedings at the ITC would likely
be welcomed by nonparty importers as well as patent holders.
Nonparties who were unable to argue their cases in the first
instance would be given the opportunity to bring evidence and
argue about the proper meaning of claim terms and infringement.
Patent holders would be more involved in the enforcement of their
patents instead of having informal interactions with Customs
while being excluded from any further formal proceedings. And
the ITC would be able to revisit its decisions in light of more
developed arguments. Decreasing—or maintaining—the current
standard for obtaining a GEO following default by the last
remaining party is somewhat counterintuitive given the previous
criticisms, but if coupled with more adversarial proceedings
following Customs exclusions, this would better allocate judicial
resources by shifting them to rights-determination processes
when both parties are present and there is an actual controversy.
The major barrier to such a proposal is that—unlike the
ITC’s Pilot Program for Rulings on Redesigned Products—it
would likely require congressional action rather than agency
action. Nonetheless, it is a proposal that ought to be attractive
to all the relevant stakeholders, as discussed above.
B.

Increasing the Inquisitorial Nature of ITC Proceedings

The other potential solution would not involve delaying
the dispute until adversaries are adduced, but would instead
recast proceedings as inquisitorial when the adversarial roles
are not filled. This idea takes advantage of the flexibility that
comes from the ITC’s identity as an administrative agency
instead of a federal court bound by the requirement that it
adjudicate only cases or controversies.205 Other agencies follow
inquisitorial adjudication models,206 and so adoption of a more
inquisitorial model at the ITC would not require wholesale
205 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases . . . [and] Controversies . . . .”).
206 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The early stages of veterans’
disability benefits hearings are also conducted in what is meant to be a nonadversarial
model. Indeed, the patent examination process at the USPTO is not adversarial, although
challenges to examiner rejections are. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (describing patent prosecution as “an ongoing negotiation between
the PTO and the applicant”).
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importation of foreign legal norms in order to address the
absent adversary problem.
In order to establish a more inquisitorial framework, ALJs
would take on an increased role in an investigation whenever all
remaining parties default and no interested party remains other
than the patent holder. In order for administrative hearings to
take on inquisitorial characteristics, the ALJ would need to be
granted more flexibility to raise issues not otherwise in dispute,
from identifying claim terms requiring further construction to
raising validity concerns. Because the OUII already assigns an
investigative attorney to the types of investigations that are at
issue, the structure for a more inquisitorial system is already
present. Allowing the ALJ to request further investigation by the
investigative attorney would be an added adoption of inquisitorial
practices. It would also allow for ALJs to make decisions based on
a fuller evidentiary record.
Concerns with this solution are common to criticisms of
the inquisitorial system. In particular, limited resources may
strain an ALJ’s ability to fully investigate counterarguments to a
patent holder’s claim. In addition, absent a wholesale move
towards an inquisitorial model of investigation at the ITC—a
move that would likely be an overcorrection—it might prove
difficult for judges to shift roles during the course of an
investigation. In addition, there are practical concerns. The ALJs
and investigating attorneys will still be at a disadvantage in
identifying relevant areas of dispute, and the OUII’s resources
may not allow for the time- and money-intensive development of
expert testimony. Nor would a change in the role of judges at the
ITC solve the problem of excluding patent holders from appeals of
Customs decisions. Ultimately, it may be an improvement on
current rules if ALJs are given greater leeway to conduct
proceedings in an inquisitorial manner when issues arise sua
sponte, such as the invalidity challenges that so frustrated one
judge faced with a request for a GEO.207 But that alone is unlikely
to address the range of concerns identified in this article.
CONCLUSION
Decisions about the scope and validity of issued patents
have effects beyond the parties to any given controversy. This is
particularly true in determinations made pursuant to section 337,
because claim-construction determinations are incorporated into
207

See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
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GEOs that instruct Customs to stop nonparty imports at the
border. The ITC operates according to an adversarial dispute
resolution system to determine issues of scope and validity,
relying on named respondents to argue their positions with zeal
and to serve as proxies for other parties who will be affected by
their determinations. In some investigations, however, there are
no arguments from adversaries, and claim construction is
conducted without the benefit of adversarial argument. In these
instances, the validity of patents in suit is presumed. In addition,
nonparty importers have the option of protesting Customs
decisions made pursuant to ITC general exclusion orders without
participation from the patent holder. In these instances, claim
construction may take place without the other relevant adversary:
the rights holder. This article identifies the phenomenon of
adjudicating patents absent adversaries and explores how it may
be problematic, particularly because of the broad impact the
rulings may have on nonparties. One solution is to change the
timing of intensive adversarial processes by allowing nonparties
to challenge claim construction at the ITC following adverse
decisions by Customs. Another solution is to recognize that not all
determinations fit comfortably into an adversarial process and to
implement more inquisitorial elements into their adjudication.
Both solutions address the problems that arise when claim
construction is performed without the benefit of robust argument
from adversaries—the kind of argument that forms the
foundation of the American civil justice system.

